THE SOCIAL CONTRACT

Vol. I, No. 2 Winter 1990-91

A READER ON PUBLIC ISSUES AND PUBLIC POLICY
IN THE INTER-RELATED FIELDS OF . . .

. . . HUMAN POPULATION AND THE ENVIRONMENT
. . . INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION
. . . LANGUAGE, ASSIMILATION, NATIONAL UNITY
. . . BALANCING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
AND CIVIC RESPONSIBILITIES

. . . ALL IN THE CONTEXT OF A SOCIAL CONTRACT.

THIS QUARTER'S THEME:
THE USES AND MISUSES OF HISTORY

Featuring articles by
Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.
Otis Graham
John Higham
Robert Hopkins

. . . with additional articles by
Peter Drucker
Michael Walzer
Gerda Bikales &
Steve Workings
Jean-Michel Cousteau

PLUS SHORT ARTICLES, BOOK REVIEWS, AND GLEANINGS FROM THE DAILY PRESS
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A STATEMENT OF PURPOSE

Just over two decades ago, concern over rapidly growing human population led to the development of the so-called "population movement" aimed at reducing the rate of population growth, both at home and abroad. At home, for a variety of reasons, birth rates fell sharply to sub-replacement levels. Immigration, however, grew steadily due, in significant measure, to the burgeoning population overseas. Today, human numbers world wide expand at about 10,000 per hour, a quarter of a million each day.

The combined circumstances of low birth rates and high immigration pressures pose for all the developed countries the three most fundamental questions of immigration policy:

1. Of the many millions who would like to come, how many shall we admit?
2. Who will be chosen to immigrate, and what should the criteria be for choosing?
3. How shall we enforce the rules we decide upon?

THE SOCIAL CONTRACT seeks to explore and illuminate these questions, by publishing new material, and also by pulling together and reprinting existing works from many now-scattered sources. Our hope is to provide a periodical devoted to the inter-related topics of:

— **Human population** questions, including its absolute size, rate of growth, and distribution. In nations with low natural increase and high immigration, the latter is a significant component of population growth. (In an ideal world, policy on immigrant numbers would derive in large measure from an overall policy on population size.)
— **Immigration** policy, especially as it relates to the three basic policy questions mentioned above: how many, who, and how?
— **Language, assimilation, and national unity** considerations, which in large measure derive from and are driven by immigration and assimilation policies.
— **The balance of individual rights and civic responsibilities**, since, as with many issues today, population, immigration and language questions are often framed in terms of 'rights.' What is the proper balance of individual and community rights and interests?

Our method for approaching these connected issues is the time-honored concept of "The Social Contract." Most great public issues are at bottom moral and ethical ones: What is the right thing to do? How do we decide what we think is right? When 'rights' collide, which ones shall take precedence? The discipline of thinking through these issues in terms of a Social Contract allows one to achieve a balance: of individual and community interests; of the short and the long term; and of utopian idealism and the realities of the world we live in.

But most importantly, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT is not a detached forum for discussion in some backwater of life. Our issues are all in the forefront of public policy discussions in the United States, which is our primary focus. Our Associate Editors are drawn from many of the main organizations trying to influence the course of policy in the issue areas we have chosen. Our journal is one of the tools they use to raise questions, debate themes, and communicate ideas, to encourage vigorous public debate and subsequent changes in our laws and public policies.

We invite you to take part in this Great Debate by reading and contributing to THE SOCIAL CONTRACT.

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Volume 1, Number 2 Winter 1990-91

EDITORIAL: THE USES AND MISUSES OF HISTORY 37

FEATURE ESSAYS

THE INSCRUTABILITY OF HISTORY 38
Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.

USES AND MISUSES OF HISTORY IN THE DEBATE OVER IMMIGRATION REFORM 45
Otis L. Graham, Jr.

THE PURPOSE OF LEGAL IMMIGRATION IN THE 1990s AND BEYOND 60
John Higham

CAN THE UNITED STATES ASSIMILATE THE WAVE OF NEW IMMIGRANTS? 65
Robert N. Hopkins

LANGUAGE, ASSIMILATION AND NATIONAL UNITY

ADMISSION OF PUERTO RICO TO THE UNION OF STATES: UNITY IS THE ISSUE 69
Gerda Bikales and Steve Workings

GLEANINGS: SHORT ITEMS FROM THE DAILY AND PERIODICAL PRESS

US WORKERS HAVE FIRST CLAIM ON AMERICAN JOBS 75
Thomas R. Donahue (From Interface, AFL-CIO)

THE THIRD SECTOR: AMERICA'S NON-MARKET COUNTER CULTURE 76
Peter Drucker (From The New Perspectives Quarterly)

WE NEED A LINGUA FRANCA 78
Barbara Mujica (From The Dallas Morning News)

HOW MANY PEOPLE CAN EARTH SUPPORT? 80
Jean-Michael Cousteau (From The Santa Barbara News-Press)

SKILL MISMATCHES CHARACTERIZE THE LABOR MARKET IN THE 1990s 81
Doris Meissner (From Interface, AFL-CIO)

IMMIGRATION CELEBRATION: IS THE EXPERIENCE STILL RELEVANT? 83
Richard Bernstein (From The New York Times)

REPORTAGE 85
Immigration Debates, Personal Identification Conference

REVIEWS OF BOOKS BY: 88
Julian Simon, George Borjas, Rosalie Porter, E. J. Hobsbawm

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THE USES AND MISUSES OF HISTORY

Editorial

"Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it." - George Santayana [1]

"History is more or less bunk." - Henry Ford [2]

Henry Ford to the contrary notwithstanding, many of us incline toward Santayana's view. Without expecting events to repeat themselves, we call on history, as well as we can understand it, to help orient ourselves in time, place and direction. The saying that there is "no need to reinvent the wheel" encourages us to examine what has gone before. In this issue of THE SOCIAL CONTRACT we take a look at the uses and misuses of history as they affect our cluster of issues.

Errors abound. The simple manufacturing of history is perhaps the most egregious. On other occasions, we are tempted to judge past events by today's standards — and today's events by past standards. Either approach leads to distortion.

In the immigration debate, one of the most common errors is the false analogy: because some measure worked (or didn't work) in the past, it will (or won't) work today. A good example of this is the contention that since the large numbers of immigrants we received in the first two decades of this century assimilated more or less satisfactorily, today's high numbers will also do so. Not to worry.

But things are different now. Consider the matter of language. The last great wave of immigration between 1905 and 1915, when nearly one million people a year entered this country, brought people from literally dozens of different language backgrounds. In 1910 people came from the Eastern Hemisphere by way of arduous journeys and with little thought of going back (though many did so). It was imperative for them to learn English in order to leave their ethnic enclaves and succeed.

Today, through the accidents of history, we have large numbers of people coming from similar language backgrounds who therefore find less need to acquire a new language to survive. Many immigrants come from countries close at hand by way of convenient modes of transportation. They often think of keeping their ties with the home country and perhaps returning after acquiring better means of support.

Eighty years ago there was a vigorous immigrant press, but now, in addition, we have radio and television. It is far more possible to get information in the native tongue, and less necessary to make the transition to English. In those former years, the government worked toward assimilation (Teddy Roosevelt was eloquent in support of this viewpoint). Jane Addams at Hull House, and the settlement house movement in general, worked energetically to teach English to the newcomers along with the skills necessary for social survival in urban America. Today the government is confused at best, providing ballots and services in languages other than English, and underwriting bilingual education programs which encourage retention of the native tongue as the primary vehicle of communication.

Perhaps most significantly, there was a hiatus in immigration between 1925 and 1950, attributable to the immigration ceiling put in place in 1924, to the Great Depression, and to the Second World War. This gave the engine of social assimilation a chance to work. Studying together in the public schools, thrust together by circumstance into the military and defense plants, large numbers of immigrants from diverse cultures were incorporated into the American body politic. Today, neither such a break in the stream of migration nor a comparable stimulus to assimilation is in sight.

Lincoln once remarked: "As our case is new, so we must think anew and act anew. We must disenthrall ourselves, and then we shall save our country." [3] In that spirit we invite you, by way of this issue of THE SOCIAL CONTRACT, to take a look at the uses and misuses of history, particularly as they pertain to the debates about immigration policy and assimilation.

John H. Tanton
January 1, 1991

[1] Santayana, George, The Life of Reason (1905 - 1906), vol. 1, "Reason in Common Sense."
[2] Ford, Henry, interview with Charles N. Wheeler, Chicago Tribune, May 25, 1916.
[3] Lincoln, Abraham, Second Annual Message to Congress, Dec. 1, 1862.

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For our "What's past is prologue" department and lead-off article for this issue of THE SOCIAL CONTRACT we are pleased to reprint an essay on "The Inscrutability of History" which appeared as chapter 7 of the book The Bitter Heritage: Vietnam and American Democracy, 1941-1966. *Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. is the Albert Schweitzer Professor of Humanities at the City College of New York, has been a special assistant to two presidents, and is the recipient of Pulitzer Prizes in both history and biography. To help set the background for an analysis of the Vietnam dilemma in 1966, Dr. Schlesinger wrote about the use of history as a means of prediction. (Indeed, as we go to press, the "Munich analogy" is very much on the lips of commentators regarding the crisis in the Persian Gulf.) Appeals to history are common in the immigration debate; we need to be wary of applying the "lessons" of the past too literally to the present. While reading this essay, keep in mind that it was published in 1966.*

THE INSCRUTABILITY OF HISTORY

By Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.

As one who is by profession an historian and has been by occasion a government official, I have long been fascinated and perplexed by the interaction between history and public decision: fascinated because, by this process, past history becomes an active partner in the making of new history; perplexed because the role of history in this partnership remains both elusive and tricky.

It is elusive because, if one excludes charismatic politics —the politics of the prophet and the medicine man—one is bound to conclude that all thought which leads to decisions of public policy is in essence historical. Public decision in rational politics necessarily implies a guess about the future derived from the experience of the past. It implies an expectation, or at the very least a hope, that certain actions will produce tomorrow the same sort of results they produced yesterday. This guess about the future may be based on a comprehensive theory of historical change, as with the Marxists; or it may be based on specific analogies drawn from the past; or it may be based on an unstated and intuitive sense of the way things happen. But, whatever it is based on, it involves, explicitly or implicitly, an historical judgment.

And the problem is tricky because, when explicit historical judgments intervene, one immediately encounters a question which is, in the abstract, insoluble: Is the history invoked really the source of policies, or is it the source of arguments designed to vindicate policies adopted for antecedent reasons? Moreover, even when history is in some sense the source of policies, the lessons of history are generally so ambiguous that the antecedent reasons often determine the choice between alternative historical interpretations. Thus, in France between the wars Reynaud and Mandel drew one set of conclusions from the First World War, Bonnet and Laval another. Yet one cannot, on the other hand, reduce the function of history in public policy to that of mere rationalization, for historical models acquire a life of their own. Once a statesman begins to identify the present with the past, he may in time be carried further than he intends by the bewitchment of analogy.

However hard it may be to define with precision the role of history in public policy, it is evident that this role must stand or fall on the success of history as a means of prediction—on the proposition that knowledge of yesterday provides guidance for tomorrow. This is a point, it should immediately be said, on which professional historians, on the whole, have few illusions among themselves. They privately regard history as its own reward; they study it for the intellectual and aesthetic fulfillment they find in the disciplined attempt to reconstruct the past and, perhaps, for the ironic aftertaste in the contemplation of man's heroism and folly, but for no more utilitarian reason. They understand better than outsiders that historical training confers no automatic wisdom in the realm of public affairs. Guizot, Bancroft, Macaulay, Thiers, Morley, Bryce, Theodore Roosevelt,

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From the book *The Bitter Heritage* by Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., published by Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston. Copyright (c) 1966 by Houghton Mifflin Company. Reprinted by permission.

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Woodrow Wilson: one cannot say that their training as historians deeply influenced their practice as politicians; and the greatest of them—Roosevelt and Wilson—were harmed as politicians by exactly the moralism from which the study of history might have saved them. But then neither was a particularly good historian.*

Yet historians, in spite of their candor within the fellowship, sometimes invoke arguments of a statelier sort in justifying themselves to society. Thus Raleigh: "We may gather out of History a policy no less wise than eternal; by the comparison and application of other men's fore-passed miseries with our own errors and ill-deservings." Or Burke: "In history, a great volume is unrolled for our instruction, drawing the materials of future wisdom from the past errors and infirmities of mankind." In what sense is this true? Why should history help us foresee the future? Because presumably history repeats itself enough to make possible a range of historical generalization; and because generalization, sufficiently multiplied and interlaced, can generate insight into the shape of things to come.

Many professional historians—perhaps most—reject the idea that generalization is the goal of history. We all respond, in Marc Bloch's phrase, to "the thrill of learning singular things." Indeed, it is the commitment to concrete reconstruction as against abstract generalization—to life as against laws—which distinguishes history from sociology. Yet, on the other hand, as Crane Brinton once put it, "the doctrine of the absolute uniqueness of events in history seems nonsense." Even historians who are skeptical of attempts to discern a final and systematic order in history acknowledge the existence of a variety of uniformities and recurrences. There can be no question that generalizations about the past, defective as they may be, are possible—and that they can strengthen the capacity of statesmen to deal with the future.

So historians have long since identified a life-cycle of revolution which, if properly apprehended, might have spared us misconceptions about the Russian Revolution —first, about its goodwill and, later, when we abandoned belief in its goodwill, about the fixity and permanence of its fanatical purpose—and which, if consulted today, might save us from the notion that the Chinese Revolution will be forever cast in its present mold. Historical generalizations in a number of areas—the processes of economic development, for example, or the impact of industrialization and urbanization, or the effect of population growth, or the influence of climate or sea power or the frontier, or the circulation of political elites or entrepreneurial innovation—will enlarge the wisdom of the statesman, giving his responses to the crises of the moment perspective, depth and an instinct for the direction and flow of events. The consequences for American society of the frustrations generated by limited war—the McCarthyism effect—is probably an example of permissible generalization. Sometimes this wisdom may even lead to what Bloch called "the paradox of prevision"—to the point when men, sufficiently warned by historical extrapolation of horrid eventualities, may take action to avert them, which means that prevision may be destroyed by prevision.

"Historical insight: a sense of what is possible and probable in human affairs, derived from a feeling for the continuities and discontinuities of existence."

The result is historical insight: that is, a sense of what is possible and probable in human affairs, derived from a feeling for the continuities and discontinuities of existence. This sense is comparable not to the mathematical equations of the physicist but to the diagnostic judgments of the doctor. It is this form of historical insight which has led in recent years to Bertrand de Jouvenel's *L'Art de la Conjecture* and to the stimulating intellectual exercise involved in the search for *futuribles*. But *futuribles* are speculative constructions of possible long-range futures, useful perhaps to those who may be presidents and prime ministers in 2000, hardly to their predecessors in 1970.

Still every day around the planet great decisions are being made (or at least rationalized) in terms of short-run historical estimates. The whole Marxist world, of course, is sworn to a determinist view of the future, according to which fixed causes produce fixed effects and mankind is moving along a predestined path through predestined stages to a single predestined conclusion. For the Marxists, history has become a 'positive model': it prescribes not only for the long but for the short run,

*Churchill is a different matter; but he was a politician who turned to history, not an historian who turned to politics. So too was Kennedy.

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not only strategy but tactics—the immediate policies to be favored, courses pursued, action taken. It is a tribute to the devotion of Marxists, if hardly to their intelligence, that they have remained so indefatigably loyal to their metaphysic in spite of the demonstrated limits of Marxism as a system of prediction.

For, if any thesis was central to the Marxist vision of history, it was that the process of modernization, of industrialization, of social and economic development, would infallibly carry every nation from feudalism through capitalism to communism: that the communist society was the inevitable culmination of the development process. Thus Marx contended that, the more developed a country was, the more prepared it was for communism, and that communism in consequence must come first to the most industrialized nations. In fact, communism has come only to nations in a relatively early stage of development, like Russia and China, and it has come to such nations precisely as a means to modernization, not as a consequence of it. Instead of being the climax of the development process, the end of the journey, communism is now revealed as a technique of social discipline which a few countries in early stages of development have adopted in the hope of speeding the pace of modernization. Instead of the ultimate destinations toward which all societies are ineluctably moving, communism now appears an epiphenomenon of the transition from stagnation to development. Modernization, as it proceeds, evidently carries nations not toward Marx but away from Marx—and this would appear true even of the Soviet Union itself.

History thus far has refuted the central proposition in Marx's system of prediction. It has also refuted important corollary theses—notably the idea that the free economic order could not possibly last. Far from obeying dogma and perishing of its own inner contradictions, free society in the developed world has rarely displayed more creativity and vitality. It is casting as powerful a spell on the intellectuals and the youth of the communist world as the communist world cast on us during the Depression thirty years ago.

"In the end, the Marxists were undone by Marxism."

Why did Marx go wrong here? His forecast of the inevitable disintegration of free society was plausibly based on the *laissez faire* capitalism of the mid-nineteenth century. This devil-take-the-hindmost economic order did very likely contain the seeds of its own destruction—especially in those tendencies, pronounced irreversible by Marx, toward an ever widening gap between rich and poor (alleged to guarantee the ultimate impoverishment of the masses) and toward an ever increasing frequency and severity of structural economic crisis (alleged to guarantee the progressive instability of the system). This may indeed be a salient example of the "paradox of prevision"; for the Marxist forecast unquestionably stimulated progressive democrats to begin the reform of classical capitalism through the invention of the affirmative state. "The more we condemn unadulterated Marxian Socialism," Theodore Roosevelt used to say, "the stouter should be our insistence on thoroughgoing social reforms." The combination of the affirmative state with the extraordinary success of the free economic order as an engine of production - a success which, contrary to *laissez faire* dogma, government intervention increased rather than hampered - eventually thwarted the Marxist prophecy.

In the end, the Marxists were undone by Marxism. Ideology told them that those who owned the economy *must* own the state, and the state could therefore never act against their desires or interests. Yet fifteen years before the *Communist Manifesto* an American President, Andrew Jackson, had already suggested that the state in a democratic society, far from being the instrument of the possessors, could well become the means by which those whom Jackson called the "humble members of society" might begin to redress the balance of social power against those whom Hamilton had called the "rich and well-born." Thus, in the twentieth-century developed world, the economic machine drowned the revolution in consumers' goods, while the affirmative state, with its policies of piecemeal intervention in the economy, brought about both a relative redistribution of wealth (defeating Marx's prediction of the immiseration of the poor) and a relative stabilization of the economy (defeating Marx's prediction of ever deepening cyclical crisis). The last place to look for a Marxist victory is precisely the place where Marx said it would come first—i.e., in the most developed countries.

So the Marxist prophecy of a single obligatory destiny for mankind has missed in both its parts: in its prediction of the irresistible breakdown of the free economy, and in its prediction of the irresistible triumph of communism as the fulfillment of the development process. In spite of many subsidiary insights and suc-

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cesses, Marxism must surely stand in our time as the spectacular flop of history as prophecy. The failure, indeed, has been so complete that contemporary Marxists revile each other in seeking the true meaning of the most elementary doctrines; the more fanatical stand Marx on his head, rejecting his basic theory and arguing that communism will come "out of the countryside," not the city.

Yet the democratic world is hardly in a position to take too much satisfaction from the intellectual collapse of Marxism. It is true that our philosophical heritage—empirical, pragmatic, ironic, pluralistic, competitive—has happily inoculated us against rigid, all-encompassing, absolute systems of historical interpretation. But, though we may reject the view of history as metaphysically set and settled, we seem at times to embrace our own forms of historical fatalism, even if we invoke history less as theology than as analogy. This is only a marginal advantage. The argument by metaphor can generate a certitude almost as mischievous as the argument by determinism.

For democratic policy-makers, history generally appears as a 'negative' rather than a 'positive' model. It instructs us, not like Marxism, in the things we must do, but in the things we must *not* do—unless we wish to repeat the mistakes of our ancestors. The traumatic experience of the First World War thus dominated the diplomacy of the Second World War, at least as far as the United States was concerned. So the American insistence on the doctrine of "unconditional surrender" in 1943 sprang from the belief that the failure to get unconditional surrender in 1918 had made possible the stab-in-the-back myth and guaranteed the revival of German nationalism. The American obsession with the United Nations came from the conviction that the failure to join the League of Nations had opened the way to the Second World War. The American readiness to make concessions to the Soviet Union (as Professor E. R. May has suggested) was based, in part, on an analogy with Clemenceau's France. The American President viewed the Soviet Union as a nation which, having lived in permanent insecurity, could be expected, like France twenty-five years earlier, to value security above almost anything else. "Roosevelt," Professor May has perceptively written, "was determined to see Stalin's point of view as Wilson had not seen Clemenceau's. He was determined that, in so far as possible, the Soviet Union should have the guarantees it wanted and should not be forced into the sullen self-preoccupation of the France of Poincare."

"I trust that a graduate student some day will write a doctoral essay on the influence of the Munich analogy on the subsequent history of the twentieth century."

The Second World War, then, provided a new traumatic experience. In the years since, the consciousness of policymakers has been haunted by the Munich and Yalta analogies —the generalization, drawn from attempts to accommodate Hitler in 1938, and Stalin in 1945, that appeasement always assures new aggression. Of these analogies, Munich, as the more lucid in its pattern and the more emphatic in its consequence, has been the more powerful; Yalta figures rather as a complicated special case. I trust that a graduate student some day will write a doctoral essay on the influence of the Munich analogy on the subsequent history of the twentieth century. Perhaps in the end he will conclude that the multitude of errors committed in the name of "Munich" may exceed the original error of 1938.

Certainly Munich was a tragic mistake, and its lesson was that the appeasement of a highly wound-up and heavily armed totalitarian state in the context of a relatively firm and articulated continental equilibrium of power was likely to upset the balance and make further aggression inevitable. But to conclude from this that all attempts to avert war by negotiation must always be 'Munichs' goes beyond the evidence. No one understood this better than the greatest contemporary critic of Munich. An historian himself, Winston Churchill well understood the limits of historical analogy. So he defined the issue in his chapter on Munich in The *Gathering Storm:*

> *It may be well here to set down some principles of morals and action which may be a guide in the future. No case of this kind can be judged apart from its circumstances. ...*
>
> *Those who are prone by temperament and character to seek sharp and clear-cut solutions of difficult and obscure problems, who are ready to fight whenever some challenge comes from a foreign power, have not always been right. On the other hand, those whose inclination is to bow their heads, to seek patiently and faithfully for peaceful compromise, are not always wrong. On the contrary, in the*

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majority of instances, they may be right, not only morally but from a practical standpoint....

How many wars have been precipitated by firebrands! How many misunderstandings which led to war could have been removed by temporising! How often have countries fought cruel wars and then after a few years of peace found themselves not only friends but allies!

Sixteen years after Munich, when President Eisenhower invoked the Munich analogy to persuade the British to join the Americans in backing the French in Indochina, Churchill, as we have seen, was unimpressed. He rejected Eisenhower's analogy, which did not, of course, prevent Churchill's successor as prime minister two years later from seeing Nasser and the Middle East in terms of 1938 and committing his nation to the Suez adventure. This time it was Eisenhower who rejected the Munich analogy. Such incidents illustrate the depressing persistence of the mentality which makes policy through stereotype, through historical generalization wrenched illegitimately out of the past and imposed mechanically on the future. Santayana's aphorism must be reversed: too often it is those who *can* remember the past who are condemned to repeat it.

"No case of this kind," Churchill said, "can be judged apart from its circumstances." I well remember President Kennedy after the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 privately expressing his fear that people would conclude from his victory that all we would have to do thereafter in dealing with the Communists was to be tough and they would collapse. The missile crisis, he pointed out, had three distinctive features: it took place in an area where we enjoyed local conventional superiority, where Soviet national security was not directly engaged, and where the Russians lacked a case which they could convincingly sustain before the world. Things would be different, he said, if the situation were one where the Communists had the local superiority, where their national security was directly engaged, and where they could persuade themselves and others they were in the right.

Kennedy, who, like Churchill, had the mind of a firstclass historian, was without illusion about the infallibility of historical analogy. The point is not terribly complicated. Burke long ago warned against the practice of viewing an object "as it stands stripped of every relation, in all the nakedness and solitude of metaphysical abstraction. Circumstances (which with some gentlemen pass for nothing) give in reality to every political principle its distinguishing color and discriminating effect." Even Toynbee, the magician of historical analogy, has remarked that historians are

never in a position to guarantee that the entities which we are bringing into comparison are properly comparable for the purpose of our investigation.... However far we may succeed in going in our search for sets of identical examples on either side, we shall never be able to prove that there is not some non-identical factor that we have overlooked, and this non-identical factor is not the decisive factor that accounts for the different outcomes in different cases of what has looked to us like an identical situation but may not have been this in truth.

Or, as Mark Twain put it, somewhat more vividly, in *Following the Equator,* "We should be careful to get out of an experience only the wisdom that is in it—and stop there; lest we be like the cat that sits down on a hot stove lid. She will never sit down on a hot stove lid again—and that is well; but also she will never sit down on a cold one."

One cannot doubt that the study of history makes people wiser. But it is indispensable to understand the limits of historical analogy. Most useful historical generalizations are statements about massive social and intellectual movements over a considerable period of time. They make large-scale, long-term prediction possible. But they do not justify small-scale, short-term prediction. For short-run prediction is the prediction of detail and, given the complex structure of social events, the difficulty of anticipating the intersection or collision of different events and the irreducible mystery, if not invincible freedom, of individual decision, there are simply too many variables to warrant exact forecasts of the immediate future. History, in short, can answer questions, after a fashion, at long range. It cannot answer questions with confidence or certainty at short range. Alas, policy makers are rarely interested in the long run—"in the long run," as Keynes used to say, "we are all dead"—and the questions they put to history are thus most often the questions which history is least qualified to answer.

Far from offering a short cut to clairvoyance, history teaches us that the future is full of surprises and outwits all our certitudes. For the study of history issues not in scientific precision nor in moral finality but in

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irony. If twenty-five years ago, anyone had predicted that before the end of the decade of the forties Germany and Japan would be well on the way to becoming close friends and allies of Britain and the United States, he would have been considered mad. If fifteen years ago, as the Russians and Chinese were signing their thirty-year pact of amity and alliance, anyone predicted that by the end of the fifties they would be at each other's throats, he too would have been considered mad. The chastening fact is that many of the pivotal events of our age were unforeseen: from the Nazi-Soviet pact and the Tito-Stalin quarrel of years ago to such events in today's newspapers as the anti-communist upsurge in Indonesia and the overthrow of Nkrumah in Ghana (and his resurrection in Guinea).

Occasionally one reads in the American press that leading political figures in Washington are shaping their actions today by calculations with regard to the Democratic presidential nomination in 1972. I am sure that the men mentioned in such stories are themselves under no delusion about the hopelessness of such an undertaking. 1972 is as far away from 1966 as 1960 is, and no one reflecting on the unpredictability of the last six years in the United States could sensibly suppose that the next six are going to be any more predictable. I have often thought that a futurist trying to forecast the next three American Presidents in early 1940 would hardly have named as the first President after Franklin D. Roosevelt an obscure backbench senator from Missouri, anticipating defeat by the governor of his state in the Democratic primaries; as the second, an unknown lieutenant-colonel in the United States Army; and, as the third, a kid still at college. Yet that sequence began to unfold in less time than between 1967 and 1972.

The salient fact about the historical process, so far as the short run is concerned, is its inscrutability. One must bear this in mind, I believe, when asked to accept drastic decisions now on the basis of someone's speculation as to what the behavior of Communist China will be a dozen years from now. In its coarsest form, this is the argument that "we must have a showdown with China before it gets the bomb." Here is the old preventive-war thesis we used to hear so often in the late forties: yet I do not think anyone can rationally contend that the world would be better off today had we dropped the bomb on Russia twenty years ago. Having been wrong so often in the past, how can we be sure we have achieved such infallibility now that we would risk the future of mankind on a guess?

Who can possibly predict with assurance that the Chinese Revolution will undertake the conquest of the world? The study of revolution has shown us that the emotional and doctrinal pitch of revolutions waxes and wanes; that, while revolutions at first may devour their children, in the end the children sometimes devour the revolutions; that even totalitarian revolutions fail at total mass indoctrination; that a successful revolution begins to develop a stake in the *status quo;* that post-revolutionary generations have their own identities and aspirations; that the possession of a major nuclear arsenal has thus far had a sobering effect on the possessor; that nations follow their historic interests rather more faithfully than they do their ideologies; and that there is no greater error than to try and deduce the policy of the future from the rhetoric of the present. Nor does the example of Hitler and *Mein Kampf* change this. Hitler was indeed the man on the bicycle; he had to keep moving. The Nazi revolution never got beyond the first messianic phase; its nature condemned it to *Gotterdammerung*. We must not forget that the Chinese revolutionary regime has already lasted five years longer than the whole life of the Third Reich. And we have seen in the case of the Soviet Union the permutation and erosion time and national interest have worked on what were once thought to be final motives and permanent objectives. With an equation so overflowing with variables, how can anyone forecast now the behavior of China twenty years from now?

(In 1966): "With an equation so overflowing with variables, how can anyone forecast now the behavior of China twenty years from now?"

History, in short, does not furnish the statesman with a detailed scenario of particular relationships or policies. Too often it equips his decisions with good rather than real reasons, holding out a mirror in which he fatuously sees his own face. This is not an argument against the knowledge of history: it is an argument against the superficial knowledge of history. The single analogy is never enough to penetrate a process so cunningly compounded not only of necessity but of contingency, fortuity, ignorance, stupidity and chance. The statesman who is surest that he can divine the future

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most urgently invites his own retribution. "The hardest strokes of heaven," Herbert Butterfield has written, "fall in history upon those who imagine that they can control things in a sovereign manner, playing providence not only for themselves but for the far future—reaching out into the future with the wrong kind of farsightedness, and gambling on a lot of risky calculations in which there must never be a single mistake."

The only antidote to a shallow knowledge of history is a deeper knowledge, the knowledge which produces not dogmatic certitude but diagnostic skill, not clairvoyance but insight. It offers the statesman a sense, at once, of short-run variables and long-run tendencies, and an instinct for the complexity of their intermingling, including the understanding that (as Rousseau once put it), "the ability to foresee that some things cannot be foreseen is a very necessary quality." Indeed, half the wisdom of statecraft, to borrow a phrase from Richard Goodwin, is "to leave as many options open as possible and decide as little as possible.... Since almost all important policy judgments are speculative, you must avoid risking too much on the conviction you are right."

"In deciding when to decide, the criterion must be the human consequences - the result for people, not for doctrine."

Of course keeping too many options open too long may paralyze the lobe of decision and lose the game. There does come a time when accommodation turns into appeasement. This is the other half of the wisdom of statecraft: to accept the chronic obscurity of events without yielding, in Lincoln's words, firmness in the right as God gives us to see the right. In deciding when to decide, the criterion must be the human consequences—the results for people, not for doctrine.

Randolph Churchill's life of his father reproduces an extraordinary letter written seventy years ago by the young Winston Churchill to a New York politician of the time, Bourke Cockran. "The duty of government," Churchill said, "is to be first of all practical. I am for makeshifts and expediency. I would like to make the people who live on this world at the same time as I do better fed and happier generally. If incidentally I benefit posterity—so much the better—but I would not sacrifice my own generation to a principle however high or a truth however great."

Such an approach may seem too modest, even, perhaps, too cynical, for those theological statesmen whose selfrighteousness has almost sunk our age. Most of these confident moralists have been high priests of one or another dogmatic faith (though some, alas, have been American Secretaries of State); but all have been prepared in the best conscience and in the name of history to sacrifice their generations on the altars of their own metaphors. It can only be said that, whether they see history as ideology or as analogy, they see it wrong. Far from unveiling the secret of things to come, history bestows a different gift: it makes us—or should make us—understand the extreme difficulty, the intellectual peril, the moral arrogance of supposing that the future will yield itself so easily to us.

"I returned," Ecclesiastes reminds us, "and saw under the sun that the race is not to the swift, nor the battle to the strong, neither yet bread to the wise nor riches to men of understanding, but time and chance happeneth to them all." The Old Testament carries the case against historical generalization to the extreme. But, without going so far, we can agree that history should lead statesmen to a profound and humbling sense of human frailty—to a recognition of the fact, so insistently demonstrated by experience and so tragically destructive of our most cherished certitudes, that the possibilities of history are far richer and more various than the human intellect is likely to conceive. This, and the final perception that while the tragedy of history implicates us all in the common plight of humanity, we are never relieved, despite the limits of our knowledge and the darkness of our understanding, from the necessity of meeting our obligations.

When I want to understand what is happening today or try to decide what will happen tomorrow, I look back.

- Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.

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Distinguished Professor of History at the University of California, Santa Barbara, Dr. Otis Graham is a member of the board of directors of the Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR), and has been active in the population and environmental movements for many years. His essay on the "Uses and Misuses of History", reprinted from The Public Historian, Vol. 8, No. 2 (Spring 1986), and (c) 1986 by the National Council on Public History, helps set the theme for this special issue of THE SOCIAL CONTRACT.

USES AND MISUSES OF HISTORY IN THE DEBATE OVER IMMIGRATION REFORM

By Otis L. Graham, Jr.

In no other realm of our national life are we so hampered and stultified by the dead hand of the past as we are in this field of immigration.
-Harry S. Truman

The seat of the mind is in memory.
-Saint Augustine

The United States entered a new era of large-scale immigration in the late 1960s, and in response to mounting public concern, Congress debated and almost passed a major immigration reform measure between 1981 and 1984. The Immigration Reform and Control Act (henceforth, Simpson-Mazzoli) expired at the very end of the 98th Congress after agonizing and laborious months of hearings and legislative maneuvers. Though Senator Alan Simpson doggedly introduced a different measure in early 1985 for its uncertain run against the odds, it aimed at illegal immigration, leaving the legal variety for another day. It may be said that the Simpson-Mazzoli reform bill of the early 1980s is now a very interesting piece of what students sometimes call "past history." [1]

What advisers did the politicians call upon as they contemplated a policy response to new immigration circumstances? Reviewing the long policy debate, which actually began with an executive branch task force study in the Ford administration and carried through the Hesburgh Commission to the extensive hearings on Simpson-Mazzoli, one finds Congress taking counsel from government bureaucrats drawn from the law enforcement, social welfare, and foreign policy fields; from academic demographers and economists; and, overwhelmingly, as always, from the self-selected representatives of interest groups who have a special concern with the topic. In this case, the latter were spokesmen from agri-business, labor unions, Mexican-American organizations, the immigration bar, church and philanthropic organizations, Chambers of Commerce, and any stray public interest group from population or conservation perspectives who wished to advise if not consent. This was proper, and traditional. The subject of immigration touches many aspects of human life, and requires illumination from many disciplines and social perspectives. But as one separated the subject matter into time dimensions - into references to what is past, to what is present, to what will be in the future - it would be my estimate that reference to things in the past at least matched in frequency mention of current situations, and easily exceeded references to the future. What happened in the past was much alluded to by congressmen and senators, and economists, lawyers, and other expert witnesses made judgments about history. The past was abundantly engaged, but professional historians were virtually absent.

"History is much used in the form of its 'lessons'. . . such uses are often painful misuses."

This, too, is traditional. Historians have not much noticed and almost never protested our absence from the more formal realms of policy-making. Yet our subject matter, not in the sense of ownership but of lifelong professional engagement, is amply and invariably present there. History is much used in the form of its "lessons." The case under study enlarges a general finding that such uses are most often painful misuses.

In this essay I shall attempt to demonstrate how this was so, and to suggest remedies. The latter is no simple task. If history is mis-used, should professional historians strive for a form of historic preservation, by demanding that policymakers remove their presentist

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hands from the body of Clio? Some may be attracted to this purist stance, but its real impact would be minimal. Another possibility is to accept the role of critic of the abuses of history in policy discussion. This seems a useful function, and may be carried out within the policymaking process, when the invitation to participate is extended, or from the sidelines. It is an important assignment, but one with a negative cast to it. Might historians also devise and advocate more positive uses? I shall offer some suggestions as to how we might move in both these directions, taking as a case study the debate over immigration policy reform.

This cluster of topics deserves a book-length study. Even in so bounded an arena as the 1981-84 Washington deliberations upon immigration reform, and working only with official reports and printed congressional testimony while excluding the uncharted inner hearts of policymakers where history sits as memory, an essay can hardly exhaust the matter. This essay is a small and imperfect attempt to arrive at a larger understanding of history's current and potential roles in policymaking.

* * * * * *

There is a striking pattern in the many misconceived resorts to past experience in the immigration policy discussion of 1981-84. Misleading analogies and extrapolations almost invariably pushed the policy debate in one direction only. If the two broad poles were to regard current high immigration levels as troubling, or as no real problem - to favor less immigration, or more - then the past was drawn upon almost invariably to reinforce the position that immigration is good because it was formerly a good, and more continues to be better. What is remarkable in the published debate among policymakers is the almost uncontested assumption that history "taught" that restrictionist reforms in the 1980s should be defeated.

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This is a mis-use of history and a matter to which I shall return. But was it influential in policymaking? Some have answered in the negative, arguing that politicians make reference to history only to "provide an aura of intellectual authority for a position already decided." [2] Surely there is some truth in this assertion, but my experience in immigration discussions suggests that it goes too far. There are many reasons why Simpson-Mazzoli failed to be enacted by the 97th and 98th Congresses, and why it took the forms presented to the full Senate (1982, 1983) and House (1984) as an inadequate piece of legislation falling far short of restoring national control of immigration to the U.S. A major reason was the nature of our political and legislative system, which does not deal well with a social problem in which the public interest and public sentiment point in one direction, while the interest groups who show up for their part in the dance of legislation prefer the status quo and play the veto role. This is especially true when the president tends to shun the issue, as Reagan has done. Many other reasons for the failure to enact reform might be suggested, and Senator Simpson himself appears to have concluded that this "comprehensive" strategy was wrong, too many issues splitting a potential consensus. Convictions and fears had much influence - that employer sanctions might encourage discrimination, or that certain employers might have to pay higher wages. But analysts have ignored another major cause both of the measure's failure and also of its progressive dilution as it went forward, so that by late 1984 it deserved neither the hopes of its advocates nor the anxieties of its opponents. This factor was history, as employed.

History was made to be a strong influence for delay, for obscuring the size of the problem, for obstructing or discrediting avenues of policy which might bring effective remedy. If explicit references to (let alone the unconscious influence of) history's lessons had been prohibited entirely, Simpson-Mazzoli would surely have progressed more quickly and in a more restrictionist version, as national opinion clearly has desired throughout the debate. A misapplied past has made our national future more difficult by helping to confuse the policy process.

* * * * * *

Let us recall the policy situation. Legal immigration into the U.S. in the decades between the 1924 and 1965 reform acts has fluctuated greatly, but the average annual total over those years was 191,000. [3] Totals in that range made a modest demographic and economic

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impact. But change was under way. In the postwar era, the U.S. became the world's most attractive and open society, a nation with a vibrantly expanding economy, a growing commitment to cultural and racial pluralism, and minimal enforcement of immigration laws. Even as the U.S. passed through the Civil Rights movement and the second full decade of postwar economic prosperity, mankind entered an era of unprecedented population increase which came mostly in the underdeveloped, impoverished parts of the globe.

As the human population became rapidly more numerous while yet disproportionately poor, enhanced global communication and transportation facilities loosened the ties of locality. The postwar era was thus a time unlike any that humanity had ever experienced. A burst of global population growth outraced economic development in many societies of the Third and Fourth Worlds, expanding both human numbers and human misery. Migration, always a feature of human life and an individual solution to hardship, quickened in the late 1960s and through succeeding decades. Both in the Mediterranean region and in this hemisphere, the pattern of movement was from south to north.

In these circumstances, as the only First World society with a 2,000 mile border touching the Third World, the U.S. recorded a surge of migration pressures. These pressures came to bear upon a nation with an underfunded immigration agency (the Immigration and Naturalization Service, INS) attempting now to enforce the new 1965 revision of the basic immigration code. This "most thoughtless of the many acts of the Great Society," in Theodore White's words, had inadvertently loosened the controls on refugee admissions and made family reunification the vastly dominant factor in selection, replacing the occupational focus of earlier law.[4]

"[Immigration] is now responsible for 40-50 per cent of American population growth . . . "

After 1965, U.S. immigration policy selected primarily on the basis of nepotism. Legal admissions unexpectedly tilted strongly toward Latin America and Asia, and a surge of nonquota legal immigrants revealed that there was no ceiling on annual admissions. Legal immigration totals averaged about 440,000 in the 1966-79 period, reached 800,000 by 1980, then eased back to just below 600,000 annually. Legal immigration had tripled from the 1921-65 norm. Illegal immigration also greatly increased, and though it cannot successfully be measured any more than tax evasion, estimated conservatively it probably ran at totals higher than 500,000 throughout the 1970s and into the 1980s.[5]

Thus arrived a new context for immigration policy. Immigration is no longer an insignificant element in American life, as it seemed in the four decades following the 1921 restriction. It is now responsible for 40-50 percent of American population growth, and the proportion will go higher as domestic birth rates remain below replacement level. Immigration policy has suddenly become population policy, and dictates an expansion which would have no end if current trends are extrapolated. Prior to a recent study by Leon Bouvier of the Population Reference Bureau, most observers accepted Census Bureau projections that the U.S. population will stabilize around 265 million in twenty to forty years. Bouvier adds the immigration factor. If we continue to admit 1 million (net) immigrants a year (the current rate is probably higher), and assuming a total fertility rate of 2.0, the U.S. population will reach 409 million in 100 years, and will still be growing. Yet a 2.0 TFR is below replacement level! These glimpses of possible futures come after a national population commission concluded that America would benefit from an early stabilization of population, a desire shared by most of the public.[6]

This enormous demographic impact of current immigration levels was the most important result of the status quo. Since Americans are demographically illiterate, this was not the impact which most attracted notice. There was rising concern about the displacement of American workers in a time of unusually high unemployment. But how much displacement, and where? The matter was complex, but the weight of evidence disheartening. Illegal aliens were displacing American workers in a broad variety of desirable jobs, ranging from construction work in Houston to painting the Statue of Liberty. They, of course, also filled "undesirable" jobs, menial occupations, which would not be upgraded in wages or status so long as Third-World manpower was available. The chief victim of the job competition between citizens and illegal aliens was the American black, caught disproportionately in the bottom third of the labor market. In the words of David North and Allen LeBel, in a study for the National Manpower Commission, "large-scale illegal immigra-

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tion depresses wages, prevents change in the secondary labor market, and results in the creation of a two-class society." [7]

"The chief victim of the job competition between citizens and illegal aliens was the American black . . . "

These demographic and labor-market impacts were quite clear in their main outlines. Slightly less clear were the impacts of large-scale immigration on public sector fiscal prospects. No one doubted that it cost governments much money to admit refugees on any scale, let alone the large number of recent years. But illegal aliens? Early studies indicated that they paid more in taxes than they took out in social benefits. Careful recalculations revealed that illegal aliens represented a moderate to heavy drain upon public services by the end of the 1970s, as the new residents learned of their entitlements.[8] An Urban Institute study of immigrants in California found that "state expenditures for public services used by Mexican immigrants have not been offset by taxes paid by this immigrant group," reversing earlier and less thorough studies.[9]

Apart from questions of the demographic impact of current immigration (which was to make America more populated and add to its demographic momentum), labor-market impacts (which were to displace at least some American workers and depress wage scales for others), and fiscal impacts (which were negative and painful for Los Angeles County but difficult to calculate for the U. S. Treasury), there was the question of the larger economic impact. Did immigration contribute to economic growth? This was a historical question as well as a theoretical one. Some argued that large-scale immigration was a cause of the economic growth we had experienced over three centuries, and that "there is no reason to believe that what was true in 1880 or 1910 or 1924 has suddenly ceased to be true in 1980." [10] This simplistic view was widespread, but deeper thought carried others to quite different conclusions. Leading scholars concluded that the economy in the twentieth century - specifically, in the 1920s - had strengthened when immigration was cut off. Sometimes a national economy needs immigration of a certain size and type to assist in desirable growth patterns; sometimes it does not seem to need much immigration at all. But at issue was the future. No one saw it clearly, yet the U.S. economy was evidently shifting rapidly away from its old industrial base toward a more capital-intensive, information-and-service base, constrained increasingly by resource shortages and pollution effects. In such a future, it was difficult to justify immigration policies which brought largely unskilled labor to the U.S. in the 1980s and had virtually no tie to labor market considerations, whatever they might turn out to be. [11]

Whatever the impacts, immigrants continued to walk, wade, and fly, into the U.S. in large numbers as the 1970s gave way to the 1980s. The nation's control system virtually broke down. The INS was swamped by its workload, unable to keep track of students or other visa recipients, its record-keeping a nightmare, its field enforcement personnel plainly unequal to the task of border or entrepot control. If large-scale immigration was a good thing, America was a blessed country; for in the 1970s and 1980s, this was our lot. Immigration now virtually decided the nation's eventual population total, not domestic birth and death rates. It exerted a major influence upon racial, ethnic, and religious makeup, languages, social cohesion, the structure of the economy, and the progress of domestic minority groups. [12]

"Polls invariably showed that the public wished less immigration on the legal side, and an end to illegal entry."

With a power to transform the nation which was not matched by many social developments, immigration, doubling and tripling within legal categories and spilling over into a major extralegal phenomenon, could have avoided being seen as a leading public issue only if its effects were widely perceived as benign. Experts would divide on this question, but the American public was remarkably undivided. Polls invariably showed that the public wished less immigration on the legal side, and an end to illegal entry. A Roper poll of June 1980 found 80 percent of respondents agreeing that the U.S. should "reduce the. . . number of legal immigrants who can enter the U.S. each year," 91 percent of respondents in a 1980 Roper Poll wanted the U.S. "to make an allout effort to stop the illegal entry into the U.S. of the...foreigners who don't have visas," and Gallup polls in 1984 found that 3 in 4 Americans "favor a law that would prohibit employers from hiring immigrants who have entered the country 'without proper identification'." The concept of employer sanctions, central to

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Simpson-Mazzoli, was favored by 79 percent of Gallup respondents in 1983, while more than six in ten people said that everyone in the U.S. should be required "to carry an identification card such as a Social Security card." [13]

Were such sentiments shared by all racial and ethnic groups? The polls had not addressed that issue until 1983, and the two organizations claiming to represent Hispanic interests and sentiment had repeatedly asserted in hearings on immigration that Hispanics opposed employer sanctions and were not supporters of reforms which limited either legal or illegal immigration. But surveys in 1983-84 of Hispanics generally and of Cubans in Miami revealed that substantial majorities of both Hispanics and blacks favored penalties on employers hiring illegal aliens and increased funding for the Border Patrol, while believing that illegal aliens take jobs from American workers. Asked if immigration laws should be tougher, 70 percent of blacks and 55 percent of Hispanic citizens agreed, according to a pioneering poll taken by V. Lance Torrance and Peter Hart in 1983.[14]

* * * * * *

In the 1980s these public sentiments developed into a reform movement and the Simpson-Mazzoli bill was the legislative result, carrying the hopes of all but the most uncompromising restrictionists. In the policy discussion surrounding this complex issue, one would not have expected history to be much involved. The problem of immigration was a current and a future one, and the central questions were: What were the numbers? What were the impacts and implications? What should be done? If American policymaking were a black box of rationality, it might resemble the thinking processes of Senator Alan Simpson of Wyoming. He did not know much about immigration when his service on the Hesburgh Commission began. He educated himself, and concluded what any rational person would conclude: legal and illegal immigration had in absolute numbers reached levels higher than the decades before World War 1, and the inflow would continue far into the twenty-first century unless something were done; the economic and social implications of such an influx of people were negative to the national welfare, on balance, so that restriction was imperative. [15]

This decided, the main outlines of reform were clear, though reasonable people would differ on the details. Legal immigration must be reconsidered, especially the absence of any effective ceiling, as well as the desirability of moderating the bias of the 1965 system toward reuniting families, which had replaced four decades of labor market primacy in U.S. policy, thus allowing the desires of individuals rather than national economic interest to shape basic policy. The considerable confusion in refugee and asylum matters must be addressed. Illegal immigration must be greatly reduced, through some combination of enforceable employer sanctions, increased INS staffing, and perhaps overseas developmental and population control assistance.

If democratic opinion were mirrored in legislative outcomes, immigration reform would have come in the 1980s in the form of steps to reduce overall levels of immigration, restoring the integrity of the nation's disintegrating system for limiting and selecting as foreigners pressed for citizenship. The best means to these ends would, of course, not be nearly so clear. How to enforce an employer sanction law? Whether and how to offer amnesty? Within legal totals, how to apportion the claims of national labor needs, individual desires for family reunification on U.S. soil, humanitarian relief? But the main goal of legislative reform would be clear - toward policy that was more restrictive and then enforced. To arrive at this conclusion, one need not resort to the "lessons" of history.

This was not the result of the 1981-84 battles over Simpson-Mazzoli. What the policy machinery produced was not what either Simpson or Mazzoli originally intended, and while this is the norm in American policymaking, the string of compromises had led to generic difference. Simpson-Mazzoli, if enacted in its last 1984 version, would have increased legal immigration, and failed to place a ceiling on it, failed to enact enforceable controls on illegal immigration, and granted a generous amnesty which would have increased both legal and illegal immigration even above the levels of 1984. [16]

How to account for this failure of nearly a decade of reform efforts? How did an effort to control immigration become stripped of virtually all significant restrictionist features but employer sanctions (not backed by a credible enforcement process), while taking on expansionist features in the form of a large amnesty, an experimental guestworker program not confined to agriculture, and enlarged legal admissions? The answer is complex, and one hopes that a comprehensive legislative history will be produced soon. Among the factors frustrating reform is a newcomer to policy literature, an

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unusual, lifeless culprit - the past, as remembered and dragooned into service.

There is space for only the briefest sketch of the role to which history was assigned, working from evidence provided by the official record. The testimony of the past was repeatedly said to be this: The voices of restrictionism have been heard in the land before, and the nation should not have listened. What history taught was the moral illegitimacy and practical obtuseness of the earlier restrictionist movement. "It is a shameful truth," said one historian, "that historically racism has been the most potent single force in shaping U.S. immigration policy."[17] So much for the restrictionist impulse, damned out of history. They had all been bigots. They had also agitated about a non-problem, for another lesson of our past was that immigration did not bring problems but was an unalloyed benefit. "There has been an underlying suggestion today that. . . the numbers are too high, the impact undesirable...." said Senator Kennedy in 1983. "But as I have said repeatedly. . . these implications fly in the face of American history and all that we know about the contribution of immigrants to our society."[18] The economist-turned-historian John Kenneth Galbraith declared: "The one thing, however, that we know from all historical experience is that the demand for workers increases with the supply of workers." Immigration always drives an economy upward; it was natural for Americans thus to interpret history.[19]

To Father Hesburgh, not only did history teach that immigration had always helped America and therefore always would ("Enlarged immigration is good for America. It is part of our heritage") but historians had so informed the Select Commission. As Hesburgh wrote in the Select Commission's report:

> *Historians, in their support of increased immigration, have cautioned against overly restrictionist tendencies. They point out that U.S. citizens have always been concerned about the arrival of immigrants but note that immigrants have always made contributions to U.S. society.*[20]

It is not clear who these "historians" were. But to Hesburgh, "the historians" had spoken, and had counselled that reform in the 1980s must lead to larger numbers of legal immigrants.

Beyond the lessons that restrictionism came from morally illegitimate sources and that immigration always and in all ways was an unalloyed benefit, policymakers claimed to learn from the past that the meaning of America, its sense of purpose and of destiny, was not just embodied in but intertwined with and dependent upon large-scale immigration. "History teaches," said Senator Gary Hart as he worked to expand the numbers of refugees given asylum, "that many of the Europeans who settled this continent braved unimaginable hardships. . . We must continue to serve as the Canaan for those today who suffer under the same misrule against which our ancestors rebelled. Each grant of asylum reaffirms this nation's commitment to the fundamental principle we hold most sacred."[21] "Keeping our doors open within reason to the peoples of the world," said Hesburgh, "is an all-important way to renew and maintain the forces and values that have made the U.S. the great democracy and world leader that we are. . . . It is important that this vital inflow continue." To fail to expand immigration in these days, Father Hesburgh reasoned, "would be a betrayal of what is best in us, what the country stands for above all else - opportunity, freedom, and respect to diversity. . . ."[22] But my nomination for the most muddled nonsequitur goes to one Donald Hohl of the U.S. Catholic Conference, who told a Congressional panel in 1982:

> *We feel it worthy of our time to review the historic sequences of the changes in our laws and some of the arguments which were eventually persuasive in accomplishing reform, for today we hear once again the lament that the new immigration threatens to change the social, cultural, and even linguistic profile of our society. The implication is that America as a whole will be a worse nation for it. After all, wasn't this the judgment passed by settled groups on each substantial wave of immigration? Let us learn from the past and not repeat our errors in the future.*[23]

This translates as: It was a mistake, in the past, to restrict immigration. If one hears suggestions that immigration flows be restricted, they must be similarly mistaken.

* * * * * *

What might historians have said of these many uses of the past in the legislative history of Simpson-Mazzoli? On this question there is some direct evidence. Historians, broadly defined as those whose principal occupational pursuit is the study of the past, appear to have been marginally involved in the study of the problem and the devising of contemporary solu-

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tions. Father Hesburgh affirmed that "historians...have cautioned against overly restrictionist tendencies," and presumably concurred in the Hesburgh Commission's decision to enlarge legal immigration totals. Hesburgh did not identify these "historians," but we know that he valued the contributions of that craft. He hired Lawrence Fuchs, a scholar with a Ph.D. in American government, as staff director. Fuchs laudably commissioned several historical studies for the edification of the commission members, who may or may not have read them.[24] The staff report which accompanied the commission's *Final Report* opened with a historical section, and indeed the second word in the *Final Report* is "history." Surely this reflects the orientation of Fuchs, and the one staff member with professional training in history, Susan Forbes. Beyond this point, the profession's direct involvement dropped close to zero. Of the approximately 175 persons consulting with the commission as it travelled about the country, I counted only one historian.

"Of the approximately 175 persons consulting with the commission as it traveled about the country, I counted only one historian."

This was, however, a great deal of professional advice when one compares it with the congressional hearings record of 1982-84, where experts and other citizens make their public contribution to policy. In this voluminous record, I found testimony by only two historians, one not a historian of immigration at all, and neither invited *qua* historian but as a spokesman for interested organizations. If the subject were acid rain, Congress would invite and presumably respect expert witnesses, and not issue an open invitation for all citizens to offer testimony because each had experienced weather. Experiencing weather does not make one an expert on climate; driving a car does not make one an expert on transportation. But being human made everyone participating in the immigration debate a specialist in interpreting the meaning of history on that issue. If Everyman is his own historian, who needs the professionals?

Some may think it a bit of good luck that we historians are not consulted in matters of policy, which are after all efforts to peer into and manipulate the future. Other academic experts, serving as court witnesses or legislative consultants, have been accustomed to contradicting each other. This has been especially embarrassing, professionally, to psychologists. More troubling, historians, who are surely the most tentative and ambiguity-tolerating of all those practicing in or near the broad area of the social sciences, might become excited by the prospects of secular influence. We might turn out to be, or learn to be, believers in what might be called the hard-applied analogy. If those in authority want formulas, Dos and Don'ts, we might be lured far from our philosophical moorings by the persuasion of influence rather than ratiocination.

"Historians are more influential transmitters and teachers than they may think."

These are real concerns, but those who see merit in our traditional isolation have surely misjudged the point of innocence. Historians who write in immigration have already influenced policymakers and the general public, some of whom are surprisingly literate, and this is true throughout a range of human activities from arms control to zoos. Most of what people remember was not experienced but taught, transmitted. Historians are more influential transmitters and teachers than they may think. To pursue our particular concern, references to the lessons of history on immigration issues were rarely, in the debate of the early 1980s, based upon memory. The impact of decades of unlimited non-Asian immigration, the quality of the Dillingham Report, the furor over the restrictive laws of 1921 and 1924, even something so recent as the Bracero program - these were influential memories, but almost no policymaker claimed to have experienced them directly. Interpretation was based upon some hazy recollection of what was learned from Handlin, or Higham, or some text. Our profession is already mixed up in the policy game.

How might we improve upon this engagement with policy? I remain dubious about explicit policy choices coming with the endorsement of "history's lessons," whoever brings them forward. Most of our advice should bear upon the process of analysis. One might say that there are at least three stages in the professional historian's advice, and the first is negative, the admonition to stop thinking in a certain way. The other two are more positive.

It should first be the historian's task to warn that

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analogizing is usually a mis-use of history. Here the layman requires some elementary wisdom. Situations are never exactly the same. An example of brilliant success or disastrous failure is easy to lift from the historical record, but this is no substitute for analysis, and is often harmful. Historians above all others should advise great skepticism about analogies, and encourage a critical response to their entry into the discussion in the usual unchallenged way. There is much in the epigram, "One cannot step in the same river twice." That situations always change is a cliche, but one which explains why so many of the "lessons of history" deserve a cold eye from those who would shape the future.

" . . . the 'lessons of history' deserve a cold eye from those who would shape the future."

One problem with analogies is that you may have them wrong, especially if cobbled together out of a layman's memory or distant reading. As a case in point, take the restrictionist impulse of the 1890s-1920s. It cannot simply be stigmatized as racist and alarmist, though there was far too much of that. Restrictionism attracted some of the best minds in America, including many liberal clergymen, spokesmen for organized labor and the black community, and socialists. The case for restrictionism had a Leftist heritage as well as Rightist one, which was unsurprising, since the impact of unlimited immigration fell most heavily upon America's working classes. The World War I era restrictionist impulse was indeed laced with much xenophobia, yet drawing an analogy from that time to the 1980s is simply insupportable. The Immigration Restriction League of the early twentieth century was vastly different in assumptions and argument from the leading restrictionist organization of today, the Federation for American Immigration Reform. In the 1970s and 1980s, the case for immigration reform in the direction of stricter enforcement and thus for a restriction of entering numbers was strong enough to convince two presidential task forces, one national commission, 80 U.S. senators in 1982 and 76 in 1984, and was made entirely without the sort of racist or ethnic appeals so prominent fifty years earlier.

A distorted version of history also underlay the interpretation of what immigration had meant to American society in the decades prior to restriction. History was said to reveal a simple story, that mass immigration produced unalloyed benefits: economic growth and creative, law-abiding people like your grandparents and mine. There is truth in such statements, which are a part of a larger reality. Costs came with the benefits. Immigration displaced blacks from jobs and entire communities where they had established a foothold.[25] It sharpened ethnic and racial conflict, and produced new interest groups whose influences on American foreign policy discussions were not always helpful in charting the best path ahead. Immigration on a virtually unlimited scale had skewed income distribution in a regressive direction, and restricting it in the 1920s permitted a trend the other way.[26] The distinguished historian John Higham, whose seminal *Strangers in the Land* (1956) told us so much about nativist impulses which were a part of the motivation for restriction, has written in apparently unread passages that restrictionism arose also from real grievances having nothing to do with racial or ethnic dislike.[27] The debate over restriction, as Michael Teitelbaum wrote in *Foreign Affairs* recently "is a contest of 'right' versus 'right' and always has been."[28]

Even when some episode out of the past is studied with a care and respect for complexity which policymakers do not appear to think necessary, and even assuming that one could draw reasonably consensual lessons about what contemporaries should have done or not done (and not all serious students will agree even on that), an analogy is a way of transporting dangerous cargo. For times and circumstances change especially rapidly in modern America. "Our circumstances have changed," one of the two historians to testify told a bored congressional panel in 1982, "the future is not what it used to be." The case for restriction does not derive from the past, but becomes stronger when decoupled from it: "Restrictionism begins with the recognition that immigration is a solution to human problems which, though it seems to have worked for our ancestors and for us a very different demographic and ecological time, increasingly becomes only a temporary solution and only for a very few."[29] Michael Teitelbaum of the Ford Foundation wrote in 1980: "Today. . . the U.S. situation is unique both in world terms and in terms of our own history."[30]

This first assignment of historians who would engage policymaking, to convey skepticism about analogies, was so taken to heart by a colleague I recently

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encountered at a professional meeting that he declared his disinclination to tell Congress anything at all if they were to ask about his area of specialization (which happened to be immigration). His expertise was in the issues of another era, he maintained, far removed from the changed circumstances of today. This seems a prudent view with which I have some sympathy, but I think it not the last word. Perhaps there is some use after all for carefully disciplined analogical thinking, an area where we have much work to do. When some historical episode is close in time, thus shaped by currents similar to our own, it seems a mistake not to ponder its contemporary bearing. Take the issue, within the larger Simpson-Mazzoli framework, of "amnesty," or as some prefer, legalization of illegals already here. Commendably, the European and Canadian experiences with amnesties were the subject of careful study, and found to impart a discouraging message to the supporters of this unprecedented (in U.S. immigration policy) stroke-of-the-pen solution to the presence of illegal aliens. It appears from the history of recent amnesties abroad that they do not reach the target population adequately, and have to be repeated. Historical analogies in this case suggested that Simpson-Mazzoli become a somewhat narrower gate, dropping the idea of amnesty altogether as unlikely to achieve its ends and objectionable on other grounds. These "lessons" of experience abroad were ignored, or at least given little weight, and amnesty was a part of the final Simpson-Mazzoli measure all the way to its 1984 demise.[31] The same result obtained in the issue of the guestworker program. Such a program, either in the form of a controlled work force in agriculture or a foreign worker contingent which is free to roam the nation for "jobs Americans don't want," was often proposed as the debate went on. The Hesburgh Commission paid attention to European experience with *gastarbeiter* as well as the Bracero program of the forties and fifties, and found that the studies produced unambiguous "lessons." As tried in Europe within the past fifteen years, guestworker programs briefly solved immediate labor supply shortages, but at a high price in social tensions and service costs from alien populations which expanded from workers to families and took on permanency. The host European governments abandoned the programs, and even now strive unsuccessfully to entice the immigrants to emigrate. Alan Simpson concluded: "The Senate . . . rejected a guestworker program . . . If the European experience is any example - and it is one we watched closely in our debate and in our hearings - this will result in claims of equities to justify the workers' right to remain in the country." [32]

This pondering of relevant history appeared briefly to influence U.S. policymakers away from the guestworker option. Both the commission and the original Simpson-Mazzoli drafts rejected the idea. Some witnesses made much of this version of history. Arnold Torres of LULAC commented: "We look back at the congressional history of how previous temporary worker programs were developed in the 1920s and the 1940s . . . the abuses were rampant. We kind of feel as though history is repeating itself."[33] Professor Mark Miller told the Senate that "careful examination of past U.S. experience with temporary foreign workers policy and of comparative policies in western Europe reveals an uncanny history of . . . policy resulting in problems more so than serving the public interest...."[34]

Yet here, as in the amnesty issue, historical analogies had little power when they pointed toward the need for restriction. The historical lessons weighing against a guestworker program were, as with the amnesty, eventually overridden by other considerations. On the floor of the Senate, Simpson was forced to accept a guestworker program. Analogies which appeared to support restriction were somehow ineffective, and were given little weight. Yet these were the analogies to more recent experience, and therefore arguably of more policy utility than all of the harking back to the Statue of Liberty or the "lessons" of 1921. If all analogies may not be banned from policy discourse, then one hopes that historians will develop skills as critics of the analogic technique as applied to calculations of what to do about tomorrow.

". . . historians must ceaselessly warn against the facile use of past example as a source of policy formulas."

Thus the immigration policy debate suggests a two-fold assignment for historians as they confront the layman's favorite substitute for thinking, analogizing. First, historians must ceaselessly warn against the facile use of past example as a source of policy formulas. At the same time, those of us who have not thrown up our hands in despair that analogizing can ever be anything but a source of error (a position toward which I admit some attraction) must work to clarify and apply guidelines for the rigorous and cautious appropriation of the

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"lessons" which past episodes may contain for similar problems in our present. One prudent guideline might be the suggestion that analogous situations in the past be searched more eagerly for questions than for answers.

* * * * * *

But disciplining the use of analogies, as vital as it may be, is a form of policy device which does not, to my mind, reach the historian's full potential. The most valuable assistance we bring should be analytical, to supply the historical perspectives special to our craft.

Those who appeal for historical perspective mean many different things by the phrase. A central meaning conveys the act of pulling far enough away from the immediate subject and surroundings to see the present in its true form and draw whatever conclusions derive from that angle of vision. It is often assumed that this will bring a certain calm amid the alarums of today. This seems to me only one possible result; on occasion, that perspective might produce a heightened sense of anxiety! John Kennedy, during the Cuban Missile Crisis, was not calmed by what he had learned from reading Barbara Tuchman. But there is much more to historical perspective than its capacity to nurture, by turns, philosophic detachment or a revived awareness of peril.

Let us return to our case. Those steeped in history would place the immigration issues of today in a long frame of reference, and then might say any number of useful things to contemporaries. They might remind us that mass migrations cut deep channels, as migrants relay information and aid along family chains. Immigration thus builds momentum; current flows will be harder to curb the longer they are uninterrupted, if one assumes unchanged push-pull dynamics. Or they might comment that newcomers are always resented by settled residents, usually for a mix of justifiable and mean-spirited reasons. Or, they might remind others that predictions of economic calamity in the event of the curtailment of access to a low-wage population have been made many times by those who use that labor. In the most important of such instances within the last century - slavery in the South, and child labor in industry - the economy adjusted nicely to the sudden need to get the work done by others. Or, it might well be noted that the U.S.-Mexican border has a very different meaning to Mexicans than to gringos who in the mid-nineteenth century established it far south of its original position. And I much like the historical perspective offered in this comment on Simpson-Mazzoli by the historian John Higham, in a letter to the editor of the *New York Times* in 1984:

> *The clamor against the Simpson-Mazzoli bill today closely resembles the rigid opposition in the first decade of the twentieth century to any scheme of immigration restriction. The inescapable need for some rational control over the volume of immigration in an increasingly crowded world was plain to see, then as now. But unyielding resistance from the newer immigrant groups, from business interests that exploited them, and from the traditionalists who feared any increase in the powers of government, blocked all action. The problem was allowed to fester and grow -- until a wave of national hysteria brought into being a system that was extravagantly protective and demeaningly racist. Hispanic leaders, chambers of commerce, and civil libertarians should take note.* [35]

These examples suggest some of the fruits of historical perspective, when by this we mean the habit of placing the eye where the long sweeps of time cradle the contemporary event, allowing patterns of similarity and dissimilarity in situation and context to take on clearer outline.

There is yet another meaning of the term "historical perspective" which seems even more useful to policymakers. An analytical asset which comes from thinking historically consists of the application of those characteristic modes of thought inherent in the historical enterprise at its best. These constitute a special sensitivity and skill in two dimensions of human life - the dimensions of time and of context, which might also be called the diachronic and the synchronic, after Robert Berkhofer's usage, or sequence and setting, even the vertical and the horizontal. [36]

The first dimension derives from our profession's central preoccupation, change, and continuity over time. As Lawrence Veysey put it recently, "an overriding concern for temporality distinguishes the historian from academics of all other persuasions - except astronomers, earth scientists, and some biologists, who might be called the historians of nature." [37] Where are we in the stream of time? Historians push that question to the front of the discussion. If we develop skill at anything, it is in the ability to discern which parts of the received heritage of any contemporary moment retain or even gain in force and momentum, and which tend toward debility. Every moment is composed of strands from the past, but these are never of equal vitality. Reasoning by simple

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analogy confers on every part of the inherited past the same force and effect they possessed when they last meshed in some apparently similar situation long ago. Historians know that time enervates and initiates as it moves, that it undermines many a fighting faith before that is fully known, and launches new forces of unsuspected power. As we work with time, we ceaselessly strive to discern where the hand of heritage is heavy and where light, where time has brought change. We have not forgotten the words of the Episcopal hymn, "new occasions teach new duties, time makes ancient good uncouth."

The second dimension derives from the discipline's passion to see things whole. Economists think that price drives Man, sociologists look to social structure, philosophers to ideas, political scientists to the State. But historians mesh them all, adding geography, climate, disease, and the ever-confounding roles of exceptional individuals and of accident. We may often honor our assignment at contextual reconstruction in the breach, but our discipline is inherently holistic and nurtures the contextual perspective.

* * * * * *

Where might this lead, in counselling immigration policymakers in the 1980s? Like economists, six historians might well have given seven answers (along with some principled abstentions, on the ground that what historians know "does not apply".) But a certain testimony flows from the analysis to this point. First: Beware analogy. In immigration matters (and in much else), the pre-World War II past is mostly irrelevant to present circumstances. Analogies often mislead when seen as a repository of policy formulas, failed or successful, though they may prove helpful as sources of wisdom and insight. In any event, analogies drawn from occasions near to our own time are likely to prove less misleading.

" . . . the national craft has moved out upon new waters, requiring a restrictionist resolve in our immigration affairs . . . "

A second communication rings with a more positive spirit, and advises the donning of the lenses of time and context. This essay has suggested how these analytical perspectives lead to a clearer perception that the national craft has moved out upon new waters, requiring a restrictionist resolve in our immigration affairs which substantially departs from attitudes and practices appropriate to an earlier time.

"I am not a historian. I wish I were," said Congressman Ron Mazzoli, "because this subject we are into involves history."[38] One understands his wish, for indeed the subject was saturated with references to the past, and was powerfully shaped by group memory. Judging only by the rhetoric, the past was much involved in the U.S. government's decision, in 1981-84, that it would bring a certain set of reform proposals to a floor vote in the legislature, and then would not change the status quo at all. Surrounded by emotions and maxims derived out of history, Mazzoli understandably wished to be a historian in order to sort it all out. Historians were not ready to be of much help, in the sense that there is no mature literature on the uses and misuses of history in policymaking. Unguided, Mazzoli and his colleagues did as they wished with the past.

What are we to make of this instance? We find the past mostly drawn upon, and apparently most effectively drawn upon, by the opponents of policy change. In the early 1980s, the past was made to confer legitimacy upon a virtual open door to migrating peoples, since that had brought us all here and endowed this nation with a moral superiority denied to more ordinary societies. History laid a moral incubus upon the very idea of restriction upon free entry, an idea stained by association with bigoted men alarmed about a non-problem. Historic memories made the American Jew an instinctive opponent of immigration curbs and gave some Hispanics a deep wariness about any discussion of a policy area somehow associated with WASP nativism. Thus was history made to serve as one of the obstacles to a policy revision which was and remains long overdue.

Have we uncovered a trail toward some general rule, the past tending to lend itself to conservative (in the sense of preserving the policy status quo) purposes? Contrary evidence comes readily to mind. Immigration as a policy topic presents unusual peculiarities. It is not often that a contemporary policy reform bears some resemblance to a course of action that had "already been tried" sixty years before, and this earlier reform had come to be remembered (historians were crucially active in shaping this recollection) as somehow disreputable in motive and some sort of mistake. And one can quickly call to mind radical departures in public policy

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for which the official rationale was essentially historical - Harry Truman's decision to intervene in Korea, Hitler and Mussolini's expansionism in the 1930s, even "the Reagan Revolution" of 1981-198?.

Thus it would not appear that the past is consistently lending itself to a role as opposer of each and every sharp policy redirection. Yet perhaps the Simpson-Mazzoli case is indeed a clue to something larger. At least in our own immediate era, and in domestic policy, the past, as remembered by participants in policymaking broadly conceived, appears to function as one source of resistance to two sorts of policy revision in particular. History is effectively deployed against suggestions that the government undertake a more active social role. This function of the "lessons of the past" is a recent one. The situation was quite the reverse when John Kennedy came to the White House, and the pattern will presumably continue to prove unstable. A more durable pattern may possibly be discerned as one ponders the immigration debate, suggesting that the past seems also to be called upon frequently and with apparent effectiveness to impede or discredit policy change which partially or wholly repudiates and departs from traditional moral assumptions. Amid confusing and changing circumstances the past seems to lend itself especially well to the needs of those who resist policy changes involving moral and ethical re-evaluation.

These observations pertain to the history in the heads of the laity. In one other sense is the influence of history likely to slant, in the contemporary era, toward resistance to policy change. To the degree that the historical profession shapes the public mind, or comes to bear more directly upon the policy process itself, it will be the influence of a profession on the whole suspicious of generalization, telling a tale of complexity, unpredictability, surprise, contingency, unanticipated consequences. The currents of this mindset move against many craft -- armadas of foreign or domestic adventurism, to be sure, but also the many smaller, useful expeditions leaving old policy habitations for newer, more promising ones.

* * * * * *

Reform of immigration law toward stricter controls in an important sense redefines the nation. This is a wrenching and difficult experience, and in an effort to postpone it, the past has been brought into play to discourage fresh thought and candid reassessment. History has been given the form of ideology, to make judgment inflexible. One lesson only from our past seems unambiguous, consensual, and entirely useful in this immigration matter. It is summed up by Alan Simpson, who came up with it himself, without help from the experts: "This nation of ours has been historically and consistently ambivalent about enforcing its immigration laws." [39] Amen, Senator, go to the head of the class.

* * * * * *

NOTES

1. The sponsors of this legislation were Senator Alan K. Simpson (Rep., Wyoming) and Congressman Romano Mazzoli (Dem., Kentucky), whose resilient and resourceful leadership brought Congress much closer to major reform than seemed possible, especially in view of the passivity of President Reagan and the open opposition of leading Democratic presidential candidates, including Walter Mondale. On the reasons for a different approach in 1985, see "Simpson Unveils Immigration Bill, *The Washington Post,* May 24, 1985, A5.

2. Douglas McLean, "The Public Life of the Humanities," *Philosophy and Public Policy 3* (Spring 1983), 6. The two poles on this matter are well represented by George E. Mowry, "The Uses of History By Recent Presidents," *The Journal of American History 53* (June 1966), 5-18, a record of politicians manipulating the past, and Ernest R. May, *Lessons of the Past* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1973), an account which suggests that the influence was reversed.

3. See Vernon Briggs, *Immigration Policy and the American Labor Force* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984), 73-74.

4. See David M. Reimers, "An Unintended Reform: The 1965 Immigration Act and Third World Immigration to the U.S.," *Journal of American Ethnic History 3* (Fall 1983), 9-28.

5. Estimating the flow and resident numbers of illegals is a minor industry producing a major library. In the notes to follow, I make no effort at comprehensive citation, but list the most reliable studies (or, if identified, the most misleading). The only solid data on illegals is INS apprehension data, which reported approximately one million arrests for illegal entry during the 1980s, with steady annual increases until the winter of 1985-86, when Border Patrol figures showed a surge in numbers and a change in national origin, especially in the world's most heavily traversed border, the Chula-Vista (San Diego-Tijuana) section of California. Arrests of deportable aliens in early 1986 were up 48 percent from the year before, with seventy-two nationalities entering along the Chula-Vista border section. (See Immigration and Naturalization Service, *Western Regional Newsletter*, Fall 1985). This fast-changing situation invalidated earlier estimates of illegal entry and the numbers remaining in the country, estimates which had in any event been quite suspect. An INS commissioner had estimated 4-12 million illegals in the early 1970s, or one could prefer the 3-6 million resident illegals and 300,000-500,000 annual flow offered by the Census Bureau in 1980 (see Jacob Siegel, et al., "Preliminary Review of Existing Studies of the Number of Illegal Residents in the U.S.," Bureau of the Census (January 1980). This estimate was clearly too low for 1980, and became less accurate as the decade advanced. Daniel Vining, in "New Migration By Air: A Low Bound on Total Net Migration to the U.S." (University of Pennsylvania, Working Paper #15A, March 1980) estimated that airport counts alone record 500,000 more people entering the U.S. annually than leaving. Vernon Briggs' careful review of the evidence (in chap. 5 of his Immigration Policy

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and the American Labor Force) discredits the Census Bureau's estimates as based on studies of dubious methodology which, in any event, relied upon data from the early 1970s. Briggs thinks the number of illegals, both entering yearly and resident, to be much higher, and Arthur Corwin calculates that between 5.4 and 6.8 million illegal Mexicans were the largest portion of an illegal population in 1981 of between 7.9 and 9.9 million (see Corwin, "The Numbers Game: Estimates of Illegal Aliens in the U.S., 1970-1981," in R. Hofstetter, ed., *U.S. Immigration Policy* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1984). A panel of the National Research Council reviewed existing studies in 1985, and preferred the lower Census Bureau estimates (see National Research Council, National Academy of Science, *Immigration Statistics: A Story of Neglect* (1985). Like tax evasion, illegal entry was difficult to measure, and bureaucrats in Washington seemed always on the low side, while city politicians in Los Angeles and New York who were paying local health care and educational bills seemed always to come in with the largest estimates. Whatever the numbers, they were increasing.

6. The demographic impact of immigration is presented in Leon F. Bouvier, *The Impact of Immigration on U.S. Population Size* (Washington, D.C.: Population Reference Bureau, 1981). The National Commission on Population and the American Future released *Population and the American Future* (Washington, D.C.) in 1972.

7. See David North and Allen Lebel, *Manpower and Immigration Policies* in the U.S. (Special Report of the National Commission for Manpower Policy, February 1978). See also Vernon Briggs, "Mexican Workers in the U.S. Labor Market: A Contemporary Dilemma," *International Labor Review 112* (November 1985), 251-308; Ray Marshall, Illegal Immigration (Washington, D.C.: Federation for American Immigration Reform, 1982); Michael Wachter, "The Labor Market and Illegal Immigration: The Outlook for the 1980s," *Industrial and Labor Relations Review 33* (April 1980), 342-59 and "Second Thoughts About Illegal Immigrants," *Fortune 97* (May 22, 1978), 80-87. An important conference on Blacks and immigration is reported in *Immigration Policies and Black America* (Washington, D.C.: Federation for American Immigration Reform, November 3, 1983); see also Jacquelyne Jackson, "Illegal Aliens: Big Threat to Black Workers," Ebony 39 (April 1979), 33-40. A persuasive review of the evidence on labor market displacement of native by immigrant workers is Vernon Briggs, op cit., and Philip Martin's *Colonizing the American Market* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Immigration Studies, 1986) is a provocative new synthesis. See also Briggs, "Employment Trends and Contemporary Immigration Policy," in Nathan Glazer, ed., *Clamor at the Gates* (San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1985). Some have suggested that the U.S. faces a labor shortage in the 1990s. The best judgment on this question comes from Michael Teitelbaum: "There is no supportable evidence that U.S. labor markets require large-scale immigration now or in the coming decades, although periodic and objective reassessments must be made as conditions change." Teitelbaum, "Right Versus Right: Immigration and Refugee Policy in the U.S.," *Foreign Affairs 59* (Fall 1980), 36.

8. For a survey of recent research which revises earlier findings from the 1970s, and indicates moderate to heavy use of social security, unemployment, welfare, and other social service benefits by illegal aliens, see Roger Conner, *Breaking Down the Barriers* (Washington, D.C.: Federation for American Immigration Reform, Paper #4, September 1982). The use of social services by illegal aliens is an area of controversy and elusive data. An INS study in late 1983 estimated a net loss to all levels of U. S. government of $1.26 billion annually for each 1 million illegal aliens, after taxes are compared to social service usage and costs due to displacement of some American workers (INS, "Illegal Immigration Costs to U.S. Taxpayers," October 25, 1983).

9. See Thomas Muller, *The Fourth Wave: California's Newest Immigrants* (Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute Press, 1985), p. i x .

10. Michael Barone, "Immigration: Best of Both Worlds," *New York Times*, June 8, 1980, B-7.

11. Again I like Teitelbaum's judicious summary: "The predominant expert view. . . is that large-scale immigration of low-skill workers cannot be expected to contribute to overall well-being over the foreseeable future . . . What is needed from an economic standpoint is a moderate flow that emphasizes individuals in fairly clear job categories." ("Immigrants and Refugees," p. 38). This is the conclusion arrived at by virtually every other modern society but the U.S. Our nation bases its selection upon family reunification rather than the labor-force needs of the economy. Simpson-Mazzoli did not propose to change this pattern. There are many views and little agreement on the economic impact of the large-scale immigration of the pre-World War I period. The Hesburgh Commission's conclusion that the virtually unlimited immigration of those years was "good" for the economy ignores the views of respected historians. See for example the views of Barry Chiswick and Jeffrey Williamson in Chiswick, ed., *The Gateway: U.S. Immigration Issues and Policies* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1982), especially pp. 189-237. When immigration policy allowed the entry of large numbers of unskilled laborers in the pre-World War I and post-1965 eras, it appeared to have retarded the growth of capital stock and thus productivity, in the view of several economic historians, among them Stanley Lebergott, *Manpower and Economic Growth* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964), and Jeffrey Williamson and Peter Lindert, *American Inequality* (New York: Academic Press, 1980). In these accounts relative wages rose in the 1920s when immigration was curtailed. There is a school of economic thought in which abundant cheap and unskilled labor, fed into an economy, is a very good thing for all economies at all times. This astonishing conviction may be sampled in the writing of that unflagging prophet of the benefits of growing human populations, Julian Simon (see his *The Ultimate Resource* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), and was repeated in President Reagan's Council of Economic Advisors' economic report of January 1986, reflecting the views of the head of CEA, Beryl Sprinkel: see the *President's Economic Report : 1986* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1986) .

12. For a recent examination of immigration's enormous impact upon the U.S. see Richard D. Lamm and Gary Imhoff, The Immigration Time Bomb: *The Fragmenting of America* (New York: Dutton/Truman Talley Books, 1985).

13. The Gallup and Roper Polls have consistently reported overwhelming support for lower levels of legal immigration. On illegal immigration, the figure 76 percent appears to represent a steady majority opinion for employer sanctions (see the Gallup Poll of November 1980, and the Field Institute poll of June 1982 in California), and a Roper Poll of June 1980 reported 91 percent in favor of "an all-out effort to stop...illegal entry into the U.S.," with 89 percent so answering in 1985 (Roper Reports, 85-6). A Roper Poll of 1982, taken just as the Hesburgh Commission and the Simpson-Mazzoli legislation pointed toward larger legal immigration levels, reported that only one in twenty-five Americans favored such expansion. See FAIR, *Public Opinion On Immigration* (Washington, D.C., 1984), and "Americans Would Bar Jobs for Immigrants Without Proper Papers," *The Washington Post Weekly Edition*, December 10, 1984, 36.

14 . For results of the Torrance-Hart Poll , see *Immigration Report 4* (August 1983). An October 1984 Gallup Poll confirmed these results, reporting that 75 percent of Hispanics supported employer sanctions, even if ID cards would be required. An El Paso poll in 1984 also found a majority of Hispanics favoring legislation to restrict immigration *(El Paso Herald-Post*, August 31, 1984, A1-2). A *Miami Herald* survey in early 1984 found almost half the Cuban-Americans polled felt that "there are too many Cuban Americans in Dade County, " The Washington Post *National Weekly Edition*, March 12, 1984, 38. Further evidence that rank-and-file and Hispanic citizens supported "strong legislation" came to Congressman Tip O'Neill in a letter from Henry Lacayo and Jack Otero on behalf of the Labor Council for Latin American Advancement: "There is indeed more than strong support for immigration law reform. Hispanics support not only a generous amnesty, but strong employer sanctions...and identification for employment purposes as well" (Lacayo and Otero to the Honorable Thomas P. O'Neill, October 17, 1983, copy in author's possession). Oppositon by Hispanic Americans to large-scale immigration should have been no surprise. Hispanic leadership,

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especially staff spokesmen of MALDEF and LULAC, assumed positions on immigration quite out of step with the communities they claimed to represent, but the reasons for this were well known by all involved in the discussion. George I. Sanchez, a scholar of Chicano life in the U.S., expressed this view of a Hispanic from the Mexican border regions: "Time and time again, just as we have been on the verge of cutting our bi-cultural problems to manageable proportions, uncontrolled mass migrations from Mexico have erased the gains and accentuated the cultural indigestion." Sanchez, in Stanley Steiner, ed., "History, Culture, and Education," *La Raza: The Forgotten Americans* (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), 69. A subtle analysis of the patterns and divisions in Hispanic opinion on immigration is Rodolpho O. de la Garza, "Mexican Americans, Mexican Immigrants, and Immigration Reform," in Nathan Glazer, ed., op cit.

15. See U.S. Congress, Joint Hearings (97th Cong., 1st sess., on *Final Report of the Select Commission* (May 5-7, 1981), 6-9 for summary of Senator Simpson's views; also see Alan K. Simpson, "The Politics of Immigration Reform, " *International Migration Review 3* (Fall 1984), 486-504.

16. The principal provisions of the original Simpson-Mazzoli legislation (identical in both houses, as introduced) were a 425,000 annual "total" which did not include refugees or immediate relatives of U.S. citizens; employer sanctions with an effective verification system to be devised by the president within three years; a two-tiered amnesty with full citizenship for illegal aliens proving residence from 1978 and a two-year wait for those claiming January 1980 residence. The conference committee report of October 1984, at the end of the "dance of legislation," was a much weaker bill, without even a gesture at a ceiling, without the requirement that the president develop a more effective verification system than the check of easily counterfeited documents, an amnesty for all in the country on January 1, 1981, and a new permanent guestworker program not in the original legislation.

17. U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Policy (97th Cong., 2nd sess .), *Numerical Limits on Immigration to the U. S.* (January 25, 1983), 78. Elsewhere in this testimony, however, historian Loy Bilderback testified for a firm cap on immigration, set at 250,000, and took a strong restrictionist position. His rationale was primarily a concern for resource depletion and environment damage, i.e. changed historical circumstances.

The legacy of nativist restrictionism was repeatedly cited in congressional hearings. Vilma Martinez of MALDEF, for example, said to Mazzoli: "I guess I fear some of the traditions of our country. One of them is the scapegoating phenomenon. During the Depression we repatriated the Mexicans. During the 1954 recession we had Operation Wetback. I fear those traditions and I fear that climate." (U.S. Congress, Joint Hearings (97th Cong. 1st sess.), on *Final Report of the Select Commission* (May 5-7, 1981), 246. In the media there were constant reminders that the earlier restrictionist reformers had been morally disreputable and feared mass immigration for no good reason. "Most of these restrictionist arguments appear to have been based on misconceptions," wrote Maxine Seller, and "the immigration policy debate of the 1980s has arisen out of much the same phenomenon that initiated the historical policy debates described above." (Seller, "Historical Perspectives on American Immigration Policy: Case Studies and Current Implications," *Law and Contemporary Problems 45* (Spring 1982), 145. Analogizing of this sort certainly simplifies the analytical effort.

18. *Congressional Record,* U.S. Senate (May 18, 1983), S6922.

19. U.S. Congress, Joint Hearings (97th Cong., 1st sess.) on *Final Report* of the Select Commission (May 5-7, 1981-, 57.

20. *U.S. Immigration Policy and the National Interest: Final Report and Recommendations of the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy* (March 1981), 8.

21. *Congressional Record,* U.S. Senate (May 17, 1983), S6834.

22. U.S. Congress, Joint Hearings on *Final Report,* 347.

23. Ibid., 32. See also U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Policy (97th Cong., 2nd sess.), *Numerical Limits on Immigration to the U.S.* (January 25, 1982), 176.

24. For Fuchs' sense of history, and especially the power of the specter of the restrictionist Dillingham Commission of 1911, see Fuchs, "Immigration Reform in 1911 and 1981: The Role of the Select Commissions," *Journal of American Ethnic History 3* (Fall 1983), 5889, and Fuchs, "From Select Commission to Simpson-Mazzoli," in Wayne Cornelius and Ricardo Montoya, eds., *America's New Immigration Law: Origins, Rationales, and Potential Consequences* (San Diego: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, 1983). Presumably, Fuchs was primarily responsible for the chapter "Immigration and U.S. History," in the *Select Commission's U.S. Immigration Policy and the National Interest: Staff Report* (April 1981), which reported a sordid story of bigotry and xenophobia as the immigrants came to do their part in nation-building. Anyone reading that chapter would learn from our history that resistance to unlimited immigration was an illegitimate impulse which stained our society. End of lesson. For Fuchs' thinking on where things might have changed since the turn of the century, see his "Immigration, Pluralism, and Public Policy: The Challenge of the Pluribus to the Unum," in M. M. Kritz, ed., *U.S. Immigration and Refugee Policy: Global and Domestic Issues* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1983), chapter 15. Fuchs' "The Current Policy Debate on Illegal Immigration" (unpublished paper, August 3, 1982), is a lucid insider's account of the origins of Simpson-Mazzoli, with some insight into Reagan's passivity on the issue. See also Harris N. Miller, "'The Right Thing to Do': A History of Simpson-Mazzoli,"*Journal of Contemporary Studies 7* (Fall 1984), 59-78.

Fuchs commissioned four historical studies (on language policy, health, repatriation, and crime) which were published in a volume of appendices to the commission report. In Appendix G, "Research Contracts and Papers," we learn that the commission contracted for some sixty papers, four or five of them historical studies of considerable chronological scope.

25. See for example John Bodnar, "Impact of the 'New Immigration' on the Black Worker: Steelton, Pennsylvania, 1880-1920," *Labor History 17* (Spring 1976). See also John J. Appel, "American Negro and Immigrant Experience: Similarities and Differences," *American Quarterly 18* (Spring 1966), 95-103; Niles Carpenter, Nationality, Color and *Economic Opportunity in the City of Buffalo* (Buffalo: University of Buffalo Press, 1927); Oscar Handlin, *Boston's Immigrants, A Study in Acculturation* (Cambridge, Mass.:Harvard University Press, 1959), and most recently Arnold Shankman, *Ambivalent Friends: Afro-Americans View the Immigrant* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1982).

26. See Jeffrey Williamson and Peter Lindert, *American Inequality* and especially Peter H. Lindert, *Fertility and Scarcity in America* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), and Stanley S. Lebergott, *Manpower in Economic Growth.* For discussion of the opposition to large-scale immigration expressed on the American Left, see Otis L. Graham, Jr., "Illegal Immigration and the Left," *Dissent 27* (Summer 1980), 341-51, and for the restrictionist views of the major liberal "Social Gospel" minister of his day, see Robert M. Miller, *Harry Emerson Fosdick: Preacher, Pastor, Prophet* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 442-48.

27. John Higham, *Send These to Me: Jews and Other Immigrants in Urban America* (New York: Atheneum, 19750, especially chapter 6, Higham, "Another Look at Nativism," and Higham, *Strangers in the Land* (New York: Atheneum, 1963, 2nd ed.). The latter book has been enormously influential and has gone through some twenty printings in the second edition. Yet it seems remembered for its account of the large role of a bigoted nativism in the restrictionism of that day, and not at all for the words in the Preface to the Second Edition which make it clear that restrictionism had other sources more defensible than the nativist impulse. Higham wrote sympathetically of the Simpson-Mazzoli reform effort in *Send These To Me: Immigrants in Urban America* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984, revised edition), 65-70.

28. Teitelbaum, op. cit., 22.

29. U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, Subcommittee on Census and Population (97th Cong. 1st sess.) *Hispanic Immigration and the Select Commission on Immigration's Final Report* (April 27-28, 1981), 54, 57. The historian was

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this author.

30. Teitelbaum, op. cit., 23.

31. The best case histories of amnesties are David S. North, *Legalizing Undocumented Workers: What Would be the Consequences?* (Washington, D.C.: Center For Labor and Migration Studies, 1979), North, *Amnesty: Conferring Legal Status on Illegal Immigrants* (CLMS, 1980~, and North, *The Canadian Experience With Amnesty for Aliens: What the U. S. Can Learn* (CLMS, 1981.

32. *Congressional Record,* U.S. Senate (May 17, 1983), S6799. The best of the historical studies of guestworker programs abroad are Philip L. Martin, *Guestworker Programs: Lessons From Europe* (U.S. Department of Labor Monograph #5, September 1980), and Philip L. Martin and Ellen B. Sehgal, *Illegal Immigration - The Guestworker Option* (USDL, June 1979). See also Sylvia Ann Hewlett, "Coping With Illegal Immigrants," *Foreign Affairs 60* (Fall 1981), 367-82.

33. U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Policy (97th Cong., 1st sess.) *Temporary Workers* (October 22,1981), 198.

34. Ibid., 225. A good example of a study drawing intelligently upon the Bracero history is L. C. Morgan and B. L. Gardner, "Potential for a U.S. Guestworker Program in Agriculture: Lessons From the Braceros," in Barry Chiswick, ed., *The Gateway.*

35. Higham, letter to the editor of *The New York Times,* July 1984 (copy in author's possession).

36. This discussion draws upon Otis L. Graham, Jr., "The Uses and Misuses of History: Roles in Policymaking," *The Public Historian 5, no. 2* (Spring 1983), 5-19. A useful discussion of the hazards of analogies is David H. Fischer, *Historians' Fallacies* (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), chapter 9.

37. Veysey, quoted in John Higham and Paul Conkin, eds., *New Directions in American Intellectual History* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1969), 7.

38. U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law, *Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1983* (March 1-16, 1983), Serial #2, 767.

39. U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Policy (97th Cong., 1st sess.) *Temporary Workers* (October 22, 1981), 1.

While this essay was in press, there appeared a valuable contribution to the literature of history-in-policy, Ernest May and Richard Neustadt's *Thinking In Time: The Uses of History For Decisionmakers* (New York: Free Press, 1986).



"#%&*!@ labor shortage! You just can't get good workers any more."

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John Higham, Professor of History Emeritus at The Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore and author of the very influential STRANGERS IN THE LAND (1963), gave the keynote address at a conference sponsored by the Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR) on June10, 1988. In this reprint of his speech he discusses some of the goals of immigration policy which are not being answered by current legislation -- legislation which strongly favors family reunification.

THE PURPOSE OF LEGAL IMMIGRATION IN THE 1990s AND BEYOND

by John Higham

There is something riveting about the word "purpose" in the title of today's conference. It takes us, at least momentarily, from the cold, external arena of statistics, trends, irresistible forces, and immoveable objects. It draws us into the warm, subjective world of human desire. It asks for goals, objectives, aspirations, and suggests that the starting point for legislation should be a vision of the good society.

I like that. I like to think that immigration, like all social movements, takes place in a great field of contending purposes - yours and mine, those who wish to migrate, those who want others to migrate, and those who do not want to be disturbed.

I am going to talk about effects and objectives rather than purposes, but as you will see I have purpose very much in mind. I do not know enough about the complexities of labor economics or demography to address all the purposes this conferences envisages, but I will take advantage of my unspecialized role in these proceedings to point up a general purpose -- an over-all, long-term purpose -- that does not appear on the rest of the program.

I will begin by defining immigrants and their children as one component of a larger population in order to pinpoint the long-term effects immigration has had on American history. With these effects in mind I shall turn to public policy in order to identify the essential objectives of the mass of legislation enacted over the last century and to ask how it is serving our national purposes.

Immigrants may be defined as people who join a preexisting society by a voluntary act of migration. They have the disadvantage of being detached from their own geographical base and at least temporarily subordinate to the groups already established in the society they have joined. Yet immigrants also have the advantage, relative to most of the older inhabitants, of not taking their new country for granted. Immigrants to this country *chose* America - most of them with an act of will that continues to shape their lives and the lives of their children.

Immigrants, of course, form ethnic communities, which enable them to keep their own traditions alive and make their own values felt by the host society. But these communities undergo continual erosion through assimilation, especially in the third generation and after. Consequently the proportion of the American people who feel significantly conscious of foreign origins has always been limited. Census statistics show that the foreign born have never quite reached 15 per cent of the U.S. population. The total body of immigrants and their offspring (first and second generation) has fluctuated between a high of almost 36 per cent of the American people and a low of 16.5 percent, the high being in 1930 and the low in 1970.[1] Compared to other immigrant-receiving countries these figures do not appear exceptionally large. In the years just before the First World War the foreign-born alone comprised 22 per cent of the Canadian population and almost one third of the people of Argentina.

While assimilation has confined the influence of immigration in one direction, a related feature of American society -- mobility -- has offset that influence in another direction. Since immigrants by definition come from somewhere else, they are an unsettling force

[1] Regrettably, the Census of 1980 did not tabulate this figure. For the first time since the Civil War, we lack a measure of the total immigrant sector of American society.

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wherever they appear. But in America their arrival has often been less stressful than it would be in other countries because here most of the older, supposedly settled, population have themselves been engaged in an endless round of relocations. From east to west, from town to city, from city to suburb, and from one neighborhood to the next: Americans have always been an extraordinarily migratory people. International migration is best understood as part of this larger process. Internal mobility has accustomed Americans to living in the midst of strangers; it has lessened the social distance between one kind of newcomer and another. The amazing levels that internal mobility reached in the nineteenth century have declined in recent decades, but Americans are still a people perpetually on the move.

"The United States has escaped (ethnic) cleavage not only because internal mobility encouraged assimilation but also because our many ethnic minorities have differed too much from one another to form a compact body."

In addition to assimilation and mobility, a third factor which I regard as especially important in limiting the influence of immigration in American history is the great diversity of origins that has prevailed among the immigrants themselves. America's immigrants have differed from those drawn to other new countries most strikingly in the variety of peoples who have come here, not in the sheer size of the influx. Until after World War II, certain favored nationalities dominated the immigrant stream that flowed to Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Australia, and smaller countries like Fiji and Malaya. Where the way of life of the predominant immigrant group contrasted markedly with that of the older inhabitants, a deep and lasting schism could split the receiving society. The United States has escaped any such cleavage not only because internal mobility encouraged assimilation but also because our many ethnic minorities have differed too much from one another to form a compact body. In the nineteenth century the largest single immigrant stream was German, and even today some studies of the ancestry of the American people still rank the Germans as our largest ethnic group; but only for two decades - the 1850s and 1860s - did the Germans amount to as much as a third of the total number of immigrants. The huge German-speaking quarters in some American cities worried older Americans less than the aggressiveness of Irish politicians in other cities; but more important than either circumstance was the fact that the Germans and the Irish could rarely see eye to eye. By quarreling with one another, the fragmented immigrant nationalities have always sought allies in the older native population and have thereby speeded their own Americanization.

"If we wish to stay clear of such episodes in the future, we would do well to look at the times in the past when a massive breakdown in community relations has occurred."

To say that the United States has avoided a lasting antagonism between immigrant and native communities does not mean, of course, that this country has been free of sharp conflict along those lines. If we wish to stay clear of such episodes in the future, we would do well to look at the times in the past when a massive breakdown in community relations has occurred.

The two great explosions of ethnic turmoil associated with immigration took place in the 1850s and in the era of the First World War. In the first case the Know-Nothing party rose to power in several eastern states. It tried to disenfranchise immigrant voters and championed Protestant control of the public schools. Catholic churches were burned; priests were tarred and feathered. Mobs rioted in major cities. For several days the entire German district in Cincinnati was under siege.

The second great explosion, coming in the late teens and early twenties of this century, produced a nation-wide spread of intense anti-Semitism, much hysteria over the suspected disloyalty of German-Americans and immigrant radicals, and drastic immigration restriction legislation featuring a total exclusion of Japanese. This was also the heyday of the new Ku Klux Klan as a nation-wide, all-purpose vigilante movement.

Many causes contributed to these outbursts of ethnic conflict. Each can be traced in considerable measure to political and cultural dislocations that had little to do with the actual behavior of the newer peoples. In the 1850s, for example, a struggle between two native ethnic groups, Yankees and white South-

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erners, was tearing the country apart. For many who shrank from either side, a crusade against European enemies offered an alternative means of championing national unity.

Yet we can not ignore the fact that the two crises -- the crisis of the 1850s and the crisis of the 1920s -- erupted at the peak of the greatest waves of immigration in American history. The immigrants who arrived in the 1850s amounted to 12 per cent of the antecedent population of the United States -- a ratio between newcomers and residents unequalled before or since. Several leading American cities in 1860 were half foreign- born. At the time of the second crisis the foreign-born themselves no longer comprised so formidable a mass, but the first and second generation together had reached an all-time high in proportion to the older Americans.

Not only the dramatic growth of the immigrant population but also the militancy of its leadership was unnerving. In the 1850s, as part of a movement to strengthen ecclesiastical authority, ultra-conservative Catholic bishops launched an attack on the public school system. In the early twentieth century southern and eastern European workingmen -- often under revolutionary leadership -- were in the vanguard of the largest strike wave the United States had seen up to that time.

"Recovering tolerance and civic harmony (depend) . . . on a period of relief from heavy immigration . . . "

In neither of these episodes was the fabric of American society permanently damaged. In the stretching, it was probably strengthened. But recovering tolerance and civic harmony depended in both instances on a period of relief from heavy immigration, during which an inclusive national enterprise could bring old and new Americans together. The American Civil War resolved the crisis of the 1850s by reducing immigration greatly and by uniting immigrants with natives in a common struggle to save the Union. The crisis of the 1920s was dissipated partly by immigration restriction and partly by the subsequent challenge of the Great Depression.

Thus the principal negative effect that immigration can have on a country -- i.e., civil strife -- has afflicted the United States on a large scale just twice, and both times has been successfully overcome. While the potential divisiveness of immigration has been contained, the social and cultural diversity that it fosters has accumulated throughout our history. Here I see the most striking of the long-term effects of immigration. Without a large migration from Ireland and continental Europe to the English colonies for many decades prior to 1776, the founders of the new republic could not have claimed that Americans were different from their English forebears, that they had become a mixed, composite people, the heirs of all mankind. The idea of an unbounded national identity -- a nation of nations -- was long opposed by a narrower conception of American as essentially Anglo-Saxon; but a cosmopolitan Americanism acquired more and more substance as time went on. Through immigration, religious pluralism was firmly established as the American way. Eventually the idea of American inclusiveness became multi-cultural and multi-racial as well. In our time the Statue of Liberty has emerged as virtually the only personification of the American nation because it best symbolizes the universality of American freedom. Indeed, it is the only symbol of any country that is recognized around the world as a proclamation of freedom.

I conclude therefore that an incomparable diversity of immigrant strains has given the American people a distinctive identity that serves them well in international relations and in their dealings with one another. It is essential to add, however, that the diversity of which I speak is fluid rather than static. It has arisen from the dispersive force of immigration rather than the rootedness of ancient possession. In the number and salience of its ethnic minorities the United States actually ranks well below some other countries. We do not have the plethora of languages that are spoken in India or Indonesia; we lack the huge differences between ethnic cultures that trouble the USSR. American diversity is distinctive and poignant because it is unsettled, ever changing, always vulnerable, and continually in need of renewal. In America most people who cherish an ethnicity grounded in another part of the world can not count on their children feeling the same attachment.

A second beneficial, long-term effect of immigration is closely connected with the fluid diversity I have been describing. If immigration comes from different and changing sources, it encourages innovation. At the simplest level let us note the prominence of the foreign-born among American inventors and also as entrepreneurs and technicians in new, high-risk industries such as textile manufacturing in the early nineteenth century,

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investment banking at mid-century, and movie-making in the early twentieth century. Migration loosens and sometimes breaks the bonds of tradition. It creates needs that cannot be met in customary ways, while throwing together people with rich, unsuspected potentialities. More abstractly, innovation may be said to flourish under the stimuli of mobility and cultural diversity, which have been the basic parameters of the American immigrant experience.

Thirdly, immigration has altered American capitalism, but in the long run greatly reinforced it. Deriving usually from villages in which interdependence and mutuality were stronger than in the United States, the immigrants were sometimes more ready than native American workingmen to embrace collective action in their own behalf. Through industrial unions and urban political machines, the immigrants provided a critical margin of support for the creation of an American welfare state. Nevertheless, immigration usually worked against a persistent class consciousness because most immigrants felt far more closely identified with successful people of their own nationality than with fellow workers of different origin. To millions of the world's poor, immigration to America opened the joys of property ownership -- a house of their own, a small business, eventually even a car -- and this has confirmed the fervent support that they and their children have given to the existing economic system. As both a force for reform and a participant in enterprise, the immigrants have strengthened the American economy.

Now let us look at the general objectives of American immigration policy. Ideally, national policy should work against the first of the effects of immigration that I have discussed -- while working in favor of the other three: diversity, innovation, and economic well-being. The result, we shall see, is distinctly spotty.

The entire span of federal policy-making may be divided into an early regulatory phase, a strongly restrictionist phase, and a reformist phase that continues to the present. All three phases demonstrate the extraordinary difficulty in the United States of enacting any coherent immigration legislation.

Beginning in 1875, the early regulatory phase aimed at excluding from America certain exceptional categories without otherwise altering the tradition of an open door and free admission. First, Congress barred prostitutes and convicts, then lunatics, Chinese laborers, and persons "likely to become a public charge"; later, criminals, polygamists, and persons with serious communicable diseases; finally, in 1903, anarchists (after the assassination of President William McKinley). During this phase a system for federal inspection of immigrants at the ports of entry was also set up.

The restrictionist phase began in 1917 with the passage of the first law designed broadly to curb the total number of immigrants and to establish a general principle of selection. Widespread public demand for such action dated back to 1886, but so great was resistance to changing the nation's laissezfaire policy that a thirty-year campaign was required to do so. The goals of the new restrictions were essentially two-fold. They sought to limit a labor supply that was threatening to undermine existing standards of living and to do so in a way that would preserve the preeminence of white Protestants in every walk of life.

Of the first of these two goals - defending existing living standards -- the necessity was becoming obvious. The second --upholding the preeminence of white Protestants -- was unnecessary, because any fair principle of selection would inevitably cut down on the most recent immigrant strains, and the new restrictions were so ethnically preferential that they fomented the discord immigration policy should restrain. There is no denying the fact that the composition of the American population was changing and that a good many of the old stock Americans had reason to fear that they would lose out in the transition; but the object of national policy should have been to temper the transition instead of trying to prevent it. The devices that Congress chose—first, a hypocritical literacy test and then, when that failed, a system of "national origins" quotas designed to freeze the existing balance of ethnic strains in the total American population -- were blatantly discriminatory. Millions of new Americans felt rejected.

The restrictionist era lasted through World War II. The legal structure created between the two wars began to be reformed soon thereafter, but twenty years elapsed before the reforms swept away the main component of the preferential policy, the national origins quotas. The principal objectives of immigration reform have been, first, to make generous allowance for refugees from religious and political persecution; second, to eliminate any preference for favored national or racial groups; and third, to accomplish these goals while maintaining the quantitative restrictions already attained on foreign additions to the American labor supply.

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The first significant reform was the creation in 1948 of a refugee policy—a policy that would admit, outside of the established quotas, people displaced from their homelands in World War II. Then, after a series of piecemeal measures broadening provisions for refugees and weakening the national origins quotas, the latter were abolished in 1965.

How well does this reform legislation deal with the underlying tendencies of immigration as sketched in my earlier remarks? Do current policies work against divisiveness while promoting diversity, innovation, and economic well-being? Considering only legal immigration, current policy seems to restrict it to a level that is historically low and economically tolerable. Current policy also makes for comity in American society by committing the United States to no overt preferences for one national or racial group as opposed to another. In general it is suggested that immigration policy was divisive in the early twentieth century, then became integrative after World War II.

Yet the immigration policies of the postwar era have left some problems unsolved and have created new ones. Two of the constructive, long term effects of immigration are not, in my opinion, adequately supported by present policies. We are not doing enough to sustain the diversity and innovation that immigration has traditionally given us.

"Instead of opening a way for prospective leaders, striking out on their own to make a new life, we have . . . granted preferences to followers, pursuing the family chain."

A new set of preferences introduced in the law of 1965 is actually discouraging the diversity, fluidity, and innovation that immigration has traditionally fostered. In the name of family reunification, the new preferences have given a high claim on admission to certain relatives of immigrants already legally established in the United States. The family reunification preferences have tended to preempt the annual quotas. In doing so they reinforce and perpetuate existing patterns of migration. Instead of opening a way for prospective leaders, striking out on their own to make a new life, we have with the best of intentions granted a preference to followers, pursuing the family chain.

This will be just as difficult to change as were the earlier anomalies and deficiencies in American immigration policy. Like those earlier deficiencies, the family preference scheme will have a stubborn constituency in the ethnic groups that believe they benefit from it. Just as the national origins quotas suppressed variety in the alleged interest of the older American population, so the current law does the same in the supposed interest of the groups that have recently dominated the incoming stream.

In arguing that immigration has had wide effects on the over-all character of American society, although it also serves the particular ends of distinct economic and ethnic groups, I am suggesting that our policies should address an inclusive purpose, a common good. Let government maintain, if it can, the fundamental role that immigration has played in the making of America. We need policies that honor and sustain the traditional culture of the American republic: a culture that has been (among other things) fluid rather than static, innovative rather than stagnant, assimilative rather than separative, and pluralistic rather than monochrome.

Our knowledge is the amassed thought
and experience of innumerable minds.

- Ralph Waldo Emerson

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While we would not agree with Hopkins that among early immigrants to this country "collaboration and harmony was attained with little if any friction," we feel he raises important questions in this article. How, and to what extent, will the new wave of immigrants be incorporated into American society? Such queries are appearing with increasing frequency, as some of the other items in this issue illustrate. This article is reprinted from THE CONSERVATIVE REVIEW, April 1990.

CAN THE UNITED STATES ASSIMILATE THE WAVE OF NEW IMMIGRANTS?

By Robert N. Hopkins

Millions of Hispanic, Asian and African peoples are now migrating into the U.S. each year, either illegally or legally. The granting of amnesty to those who managed to remain in the U.S. and evade the law has, if anything, encouraged further illegal immigration - by creating the impression that there will be a further amnesty down the road. Border guards report that the rate of illegal immigration is now so great that all they can do is try to watch for drug smugglers. But although we are now beginning to read about this unprecedented occurrence in the media, few who write about this massive influx ask the vital question, "What will it do to America?" Readers are generally left to assume that the traditional American culture and values are so strong that they will persist, despite this influx of people with quite different cultural backgrounds. Can the U.S. absorb this Third World immigration torrent without becoming itself a radically different society from what it is?

THE PROBLEM OF ASSIMILATING immigrant peoples into the United States culture and society has had a varied history, depending largely on who the immigrant peoples were and what the dominant culture of America was at that time.

When the majority population of the United States was still British by origin, the ideal of "Anglo-conformity" was the standard. This demanded, in the words of Milton M. Gordon, in his book *Assimilation in American Life: The Role of Race, Religion and National Origins*, the "renunciation of the immigrant's ancestral culture in favor of the behavior and values of the Anglo-Saxon core group."

Harmonious Integration of Early European Settlers

ALTHOUGH EARLY AMERICA had almost as many settlers of German, Dutch and French descent as of Anglo-Saxon origin, the concurrent values and ethnic similarities shared by all West, Northwest and North European immigrants ensured that collaboration and harmony was attained with little if any friction. Indeed, there was a generally widespread acceptance of the English language and of the Anglo-Saxon character of the common law legal system and Constitution of the United States.

This attitude prevailed until the closing decade of the nineteenth century, when the immigration of numbers of immigrants from southern, central and eastern European countries stimulated people to begin to think consciously about a process of assimilation which they called the "melting pot". Because the immigrants were almost all of European origin, America did partially become a melting pot, but with the essential persistence of the "Old American" culture as the basis of "Americanism."

" . . . prevailing beliefs about assimilation may be more significant in determining public policy concerning immigration than the reality of assimilation."

With this change of philosophy it has become popular to assume that the future of American society involves the preservation of distinctive immigrant cultures within a broadly overriding concept of American citizenship, and with only a steadily increasing integration of the immigrants into the American economic and political scene. The possibility that the immigrants might go so far as wishing to retain their own language was, at first, seldom considered as a serious question of any significance.

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While America had acquired a small immigrant community of Asians, imported mainly as laborers in the nineteenth century, these were regarded with a tolerant nature as a rather amusing and quaint anachronism. The large black community, which had been a part of the fabric of America since colonial days, and the surviving American Indian element, were both likewise generally accepted as subgroups essentially subordinate to the truly "American" population of European provenance. In short, America was still a nation, albeit one with several relatively small, accepted, but definitely subordinate minorities.

The way in which America thinks it can absorb new immigrant minorities while still remaining a nation is important, since prevailing beliefs about assimilation may be more significant in determining public policy concerning immigration than the reality of assimilation. In daily life, moreover, relations between the "Old Americans" and the new Third World immigrants may be significantly affected by the ideal of assimilation which they do or do not hold in common; an ideal which may be perceived as inspiring, or threatening, depending upon the status of the individuals involved. Finally, the extent to which the "Old Americans" and the immigrants are able to identify with the nation - their implicit answer to the question whether they think of themselves and of others as being a part of "our nation" is significantly influenced by the concept of assimilation and of national identity that they hold.

Assuming that elites do exist in a nation, and that these elites may or may not share the same views as the larger majority population, it becomes necessary also to ask whether the elite which dominates the political scene holds the same view on the question of how to absorb large immigrant minorities into the "American" culture, or indeed, whether such minorities should be absorbed at all. It is worth mentioning here that demands for "English only" in education have been attacked as "racist". This is nonsense, since a real racist would obviously prefer other stocks to remain separated by linguistic barriers, rather than risk the possibility of their children interbreeding with the original European stock.

Attempts to Restrict Immigration

DURING THE 1920 s the concept of Anglo-Saxon culture as constituting the root of American culture and of European stock as constituting the root base of the American ethnic type was still sufficiently strong among both the elite and the majority of the population of "Old America" to ensure a common desire to restrict immigration largely to people of European origin.

But the Anglo-Saxon cultural tradition and white America ideal has in recent decades found neither sufficient spokesmen in the governing elite and media nor sufficient grass roots support to constitute an effective mass movement. What feelings many of them had on this matter have been more recently weakened by the phenomenon of "neo-conservative" propagandists who continually portray every issue solely in economic terms, as though no other human goals or values existed. Although it could be argued that the elements of the "national" concept were still implicit in the Walter-McCarran Immigration Act of 1952, which reaffirmed the principle of quotas based on country of origin, the spirit of this ideal had died by the time John F. Kennedy, in 1963, came to publish his book, *A Nation of Immigrants*. This treatise expressed quite contrary views which were to become official policy with the Immigration Act of 1965 and all subsequent immigrant legislation - which effectively reversed the former policy of discrimination in favor of European immigrants to discrimination in favor of Third World immigrants. The official target now seems to be the reshaping of the American population into a miniature replica of the entire world.

". . . the theory of America as a land of 'cultural pluralism' has caught the official imagination . . ."

Simply, the Kennedy viewpoint argued that America was traditionally a nation of immigrants, and that the "OId Americans" who had founded America, fought for its independence, given it its language, constitution and legal system, was no more "American" than any other immigrant group. The concept of the melting pot, with a subsidiary concession to the cultural pluralism view, has subsequently prevailed.

But the belief in the melting pot theory has come to be questioned as a result of the arrival of increasing numbers of non-European immigrants. Instead, the theory of America as a land of "cultural pluralism" has caught the official imagination - the idea ofAmerica as a multi-cultural and multi-racial microcosm of the entire world.

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Preference Now Given to Immigrants

SINCE THE LEGISLATION presently governing immigration gives preference not to the Northwest European countries that established the United States, but to the surplus populations of the overcrowded and teeming Third World - which are also entering the country in large numbers illegally, only to be given the legal right to remain and become American citizens after they have effected illegal entry successfully (not a difficult thing to do) and have managed to evade the law for a further period of time, again successfully. It is quite clear that it is no longer realistic to assume that this vast and growing number of immigrants, who also prove to be more prolific in child-bearing than the native white American population, are likely to comply with the cultural ideal of conformity to "Old American" ideals and institutions.

This has become particularly obvious in areas which have been heavily settled by Hispanics, where even the Spanish language has taken root, and political pressures by the immigrants have ensured that they receive permission to operate radio and T.V. stations dedicated to their own language and culture. Interestingly, this has sometimes caused tension amongst resident minorities, particularly the black minority, when a decision had to be made whether a new TV station should be allocated to the black minority or to the Hispanic minority.

Indeed, recent legislation has affirmed the right of illegal immigrants who have been permitted to stay in the U.S. under the amnesty provisions to benefit from affirmative action programs, which is thus unfair to the American blacks and American Indians who were originally targeted to benefit from such programs in light of past disadvantages.

Surprisingly, one aspect of the "Old American conformity" concept does linger on as a phantom "residue" much like the whiff of scent which remains in a long-emptied bottle. Although realistically it seems apparent that this is currently a politically unrealizable ideal, the notion that the new immigrants will be absorbed into the historic Anglo-Saxon culture is allowed to survive as a perennial source of solace whenever anyone dares to suggest that future immigration might challenge the national premise of *e pluribus unum*.

This notion assures those who believe in it that, even if the "Old American" core group continues to dwindle in numbers and power to the point of becoming marginal, the political heritage of the Founding Fathers will survive. According to the most optimistic exponents of this belief, the republic will endure even if the descendents of its founders go into extinction, because it is based on an imperishable tradition going back to William Blackstone, John Locke, Magna Charta and Anglo-Saxon common law. Some even argue that these values will be better defended by Third World immigrants than by the "Old American" members of the nation which created that heritage.

" . . . there is no evidence that the European tradition can or will be transmitted to immigrants . . . "

This last "residue" of belief in the ability of the "Old American" institutions to survive simply because of their innate superiority would be simply an innocuous illusion were there not indications that official public policy is in fact moving in a direction directly contrary to those traditions. Today the government deliberately gives no recognition to race or ethnicity, except to advance the interests of minority ethnic and racial groups, which are thereby encouraged to maintain their own identity and to avoid being absorbed into the "Old American" tradition so readily accepted by most earlier immigrants of European origin.

But the reality is that there is no evidence that the European tradition can or will be transmitted to immigrants of African, Asian and Hispanic origin, or to any other of the millions of Third World immigrants who are now entering the country at an increasing rate.

Indeed, the social comforts of being among 'people of one's own kind,' and the political advantages of ethnic unity and ability to form pressure groups become significant forces now that the philosophy of cultural pluralism has gained broad acceptance in ruling circles.

Is 'Ethnic Pluralism' Now Official Policy?

AS EVIDENCE THAT the new ethnic pluralism is becoming official public policy, author Gordon cites "recently introduced measures such as government-mandated affirmative action procedures in employment, education, and stipulated public programs, and court-ordered busing of school children across neighborhood district lines to effect racial integration. . . As is widely known, the federal government has experienced difficulties implementing such measures with its present

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population. It is certainly not unreasonable, therefore, to expect that the present problems will only be exacerbated with the incorporation - one cannot call it assimilation - of masses of Third World immigrants."

There are optimists who still believe that the melting pot process will lead to the assimilation of today's immigrants into the "Old American" way of life with all that means in respect of liberty, justice, democracy, and cultural tradition. They hope for an end result that will congeal in favor of the survival of the traditionally prized political and legal heritage of freedom and rational democracy.

Forecasting, it is to be admitted, is a hazardous enterprise, but major anomalies can be expected as the United States becomes the host country to truly massive numbers of Third World immigrants.

Asia, for example, has an enduring heritage of not simply feudalism, but of that Oriental Despotism, masterfully analyzed in Karl Wittfogel's thus-named book, which has shown a capacity to overwhelm liberalizing Western tendencies. Japan, supposedly a parliamentary democracy, has given evidence - not limited to the widely-publicized statements of Prime Minister Nakasone - of being one of the most ethnocentric nations in the world. China remains a one-party state. The parliamentary democracy of India may not survive internecine warfare among the subcontinent's linguistic and religious power blocs. The future of democracy in the Philippines is very uncertain. The massacres in Cambodia are indistinguishable in enormity from the depredations of Tamerlane.

Latin America, with few exceptions, reveals a history of rotating authoritarian rule with failing democratic government, in which *el caudillo* follows *el golpe de estado*, and vice versa, in a succession without end. Mexico experienced a long period of what in effect has been corrupt one-party rule. The one notable exception to this pattern, Costa Rica, is virtually a European country, and possibly may not endure much longer. Democracy is, if anything, in even more disarray in Africa. The one African nation with any history of democratic forms, Liberia, fell to a military dictatorship several years ago which is now threatened by another military insurrection.

After even a cursory survey of the Third World, anyone can see that only a foolish ethnocentrism can account for the fond belief of many Americans that their political heritage - imperfectly received in the past by immigrants from nations having cultures closely related to that of the nation's founders - will in the future transform and overwhelm all that is alien. Such a universal constant cannot anywhere be found in the records of political history.

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America is God's crucible, the great melting pot where all the races of Europe are melting and re-forming.

- Israel Zangwill
The Melting Pot (1908) act I

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The issue of English as the official language for the United States has another facet that Americans need to be thinking about: the possible admission of Puerto Rico as the 51st state. Will English or Spanish -- or both -- be used in the legislature, the executive branch and its agencies, and the courts, both on the island, and eventually on the mainland? Can we learn anything from the Quebec experience, or must we fulfill Santayana's dictum and make our own mistakes? Reprinted from Population and Environment, Vol. 12, No. 1, Fall 1990. (c) 1990 Human Sciences Press.

ADMISSION OF PUERTO RICO TO THE UNION OF STATES: UNITY *IS* THE ISSUE

Gerda V. Bikales
Steve Workings

Abstract

Proposed Congressional legislation would allow the status of Puerto Rico—as an associated Commonwealth, an independent country, or a state of the United States—to be decided by popular plebiscite in Puerto Rico. The proposed legislation is silent on language policy, an issue of concern to many Americans and which has been much discussed in Puerto Rico. In addition to the divisiveness inherent in bilingualism, the history of the island's relations with the United States raises concern that statehood might lead to a separatist backlash possibly accompanied by violent unrest. The authors urge wider debate and a more deliberate approach to union: one that does not attempt to displace the Spanish tradition but one which protects the traditional language unity of the United States.

Legislation already passed (S. 712) by the U.S. Senate * would ask Puerto Ricans to decide the future of the island's relationship to the United States in a popular plebiscite, to be held in June 1991. Voters could choose one of three options: entrance into the Union of States, as the nation's 51st State; complete independence from the United States; or an enhanced version of the Commonwealth status now in effect.

Should none of the options receive a majority, the least popular one will be dropped, and a second plebiscite will be held to decide between the two remaining choices. The outcome of that vote will be the final determinant of the island's status, requiring no further Congressional action.

The Outlook for Statehood

While no one can confidently predict which way the vote will go, it appears that statehood for Puerto Rico is a very real possibility. The first such plebiscite, held in 1967, was heavily boycotted by various factions, especially those advocating full independence. When the votes were all in, the statehood option had received 39% of the vote, against 60% for Commonwealth status and 1% for independence. Since that defeat, the pro-statehood leadership has made much of the fact that Union will significantly increase federal transfer payments to the island's large welfare-dependent population (Carr, p. 150). Carlos Romero Barcelo, the former Governor who now leads the Statehood Party opposition, wrote in the seventies:

> *Puerto Rico's contribution to the federal treasury, were we a state, would come to less than that of any state in the Union. At the same time, the per capita benefits we'd reap from federal aid would be greater than those of any other state of the Union. On top of this, we would also have seven or eight Puerto Ricans serving as full voting members of Congress working up in Washington at all times to help draft and pass new and improved social welfare legislation (Romero Barcelo, 1978, p. 87).*

Statehooders have also asserted that Union will not require concessions with regard to the use of Spanish (Carr, p. 138), Puerto Rico's national language. The message has apparently been heard: a poll of 1000 voters in August 1989 showed a comfortable majority

* The House of Representatives also passed a different version but the two were not reconciled before the end of the term. The issue will be reintroduced early in the 1991 session of Congress.

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favoring statehood (Kaagan, 1989).

The ruling Commonwealth Party now senses the steady surge of prostatehood sentiment, and for that reason is in a hurry to resolve the status question sooner rather than later.

The enabling legislation now before Congress is openly slanted toward statehood. It front-loads enticing financial benefits in social programs and avoids setting conditions that would tend to make statehood unattractive to Puerto Rican voters. Specifically, it is intentionally silent on the subject of the island's traditional language and tacitly accepts the cultural and linguistic status quo. Though English and Spanish are both designated official languages, in reality the island functions almost entirely in Spanish. The work of the Commonwealth legislature, executive branch and judicial system is conducted solely in that language (Geyls, 1981). (The Federal District Court operates in English, a practice that is a source of much contention.) Nearly a hundred years after the United States acquired Puerto Rico as a possession, Spanish remains the unrivaled national language of the would-be state.

Though Congress required an accommodation to English as a condition of statehood for at least four states—Louisiana (1812), Oklahoma (1907), New Mexico (1912), and Arizona (1912) (Statutes at Large)—it appears that Congress does not feel bound or even guided by these precedents. Congressional supporters of the plebiscite legislation are adamant about leaving the language issue unspoken, for fear that any mention of English or Spanish would prove a fatal blow to statehood (Havemann, 1989; Barone, 1989).

Surprisingly, the ultimate outcome of the plebiscite may yet hinge on Puerto Rico's sizable Diaspora, which number some 2.3 million mainland residents (the island itself has a population of 3.3 million). Public opinion polls indicate that Puerto Ricans living in the United States are even more supportive of statehood than the islanders. Spokesmen for these exiles are asking for the right to vote in the plebiscite, notwithstanding their formal residence, voting registration, and—in some cases—office holding on the mainland. For example, "Bronx Councilman Jose Rivera, born in Puerto Rico, introduced a Resolution asking the (N.Y.) City Council to urge the government of Puerto Rico to allow Puerto Ricans to vote (in the plebiscite)." (Perez, 1989, p. 3). Should Congress and/or the States agree to this unprecedented demand, the chances that Puerto Rico will enter the Union as the 51st State will increase greatly.

The Language Issue in Puerto Rico

Puerto Rico had been under Spanish rule for four hundred years when it was ceded by Spain to the United States in the 1898 Treaty of Paris that ended the Spanish-American War. The island became an unincorporated territory in 1900, and its people were made U.S. citizens in 1917. The territory gained significant autonomy from Washington when it became a Commonwealth in 1952.

". . . bills to drop English and designate Spanish the sole official language are regularly introduced in the legislature."

Puerto Rico has been officially bilingual since 1902, but bills to drop English and designate Spanish the sole official language are regularly introduced in the legislature. In 1990, the Puerto Rico House of Representatives passed such a bill, although Senate consideration is uncertain. Attempts to institutionalize English in education and government have been deeply resented and have largely failed (Algren De Gutierrez, 1987 p. 34). In the fifties, English was virtually eliminated from the school curriculum, although it has made a partial comeback. Still, a recent editorial in the *San Juan Star*, the island's only English language newspaper, speculated that "the teaching of English in Puerto Rico's public schools could be at an all-time low" (Viglucci, 1989) and caustically appealed to President Bush to dispatch the Peace Corps to teach English in Puerto Rico.

According to the 1980 Census, 99% of the residents are Spanish speaking. Forty-two percent of the residents said they are bilingual (Department of Commerce, 1980).

Cultural and language differences have been an obstacle to closer relations between Puerto Rico and the United States, and have at times resulted in violent attacks on Americans and American institutions. The problem has been recognized by every student of Puerto Rican society.

Senator Henry Jackson, who served on the United States-Puerto Rican Status Commission that in 1966 had recommended the earlier plebiscite, stated in the Commission's report:

> *A common language has brought us together as Americans . . A condition precedent to Statehood must be the recognition of English as the official*

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language. The continuance of Spanish as the second language would not be inconsistent with this requirement(Report, 1966, p. 15).

Luis Munoz Marin, Luis Negron Lopez, and Teodoro Moscoso, the Puerto Rican members of the Commission, were convinced "that Congress will not admit a State into the Union until satisfied that English is the predominant language of its people" (Report 1966, p. 23).

The cultural and language differences have been highlighted most insistently by the small Independence Party. The party, lacking the promise of financial windfalls, perceives mainland pressures for the acceptance of English its best shot with the voters. Writing in 1985, party vice-president Fernando Martin Garcia asserted:

Puerto Rico is a Latin American nation. Historically, culturally, ethnically, linguistically, even geographically, Puerto Rico is part of the Latin American world. As a homogeneous community more than three million strong in an island thousands of miles away from the United States, Puerto Rico is a distinctive nation in and of itself . . . This is why statehood is not only not a solution for Puerto Rico but would also represent a grave threat to the very fabric of American federalism (Latin American Project, 1985, p. 22).*

Commonwealth supporters have expressed similar sentiments. The current Governor, Rafael Hernandez Colon, opposes Union because:

Puerto Ricans form a people, a distinct society, with its own culture, ethos and language . . . This most unequal of states would resist to melt or blend. It would be a State with a different primary language, marching under its own flag . . . (Dillon, 1989).

The Statehood Party, no less than the other parties, categorically denies that language policies will have to change to accommodate English. Former Governor Carlos Romero Barcelo, head of the Statehood party, told Congress:

We must go home, go to a plebiscite, tell the nation it is not the congressional intention to force the English language on us. This is used by demagogues in Puerto Rico against statehood . (Havemann, 1989, p. A4).

The Public Debate

Whereas statehood is a salient issue for Puerto Ricans, the imminent possibility of a 51st state has received little press coverage in the United States, and Congressional action is proceeding essentially without citizen input.

The people of the United States have no direct voice in this matter and must rely on Congress to judiciously represent their interests in actions that will affect the lives of all Americans for generations to come. But Congress is proceeding steadily to set Puerto Rico on a statehood course, on terms determined solely by Puerto Rico and with little regard to precedent or possible consequences.

Outside the East Coast states of heavy Puerto Rican settlement (New York, New Jersey, Connecticut and Massachusetts), few Americans are even aware that the machinery for Puerto Rican statehood is grinding away. To the extent that there is any widely-held general perception of the island, it is of an exotic tropical vacation spot that is part of the Spanish Caribbean. Mention of Puerto Ricans' American citizenship is usually greeted with surprise and disbelief, and the possibility of statehood is not on anyone's agenda.

Congressional action is bypassing the national debate that the issue deserves. Poorly informed Americans may awaken one day to find out that the United States has unconditionally and irrevocably accepted into the Union a Spanish-speaking nation-state with a historic antipathy to English. Too late, they will learn that while they were not watching closely, the United States has gone from being a country united by a common language to one that is divided by two.

The Puerto Rican people will be given the opportunity to decide directly, by plebiscite, the course of their future affiliation with the United States. Yet, despite all the attention the issue has received on the island, the plebiscite voters may still not have all the facts needed to reach a fully informed decision, for these reasons:

• The finality of the statehood decision is not emphasized. As there has been a prior plebiscite on status, and even the 1991 plebiscite may involve more than one voting round, the impression is created that

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* It should be noted that Hawaii, admitted to the Union in 1959, has two official languages: English and Hawaiian. Hawaii Constitution, 1978, Sec. 41. However, Hawaiian is rarely used in everyday life.

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choices are reversible, and the irrevocable nature of Union will be missed by many.

• The enabling legislation pretends that no accommodation to English will have to be made in consequence of statehood, and that no mainland opposition will await a Spanish-speaking state unwilling to make any changes. In effect, it aims to postpone all disagreements on language policy, so that their full force and consequences will not be grasped until statehood is a *fait-accompli.*

" . . . America will indeed have brought into being that most dreaded of cultural conflicts - - a Quebec situation, one entirely of its own making."

Some Implications of Union without Consensus

Should the political leadership of Puerto Rico and advocates in the U.S. prevail, America will indeed have brought into being that most dreaded of cultural conflicts - a Quebec situation, one entirely of its own making. Almost casually, the United States will have linked itself beyond extrication to a society that is profoundly and determinedly different and has a history of active opposition to the language, leadership and institutions of the majority citizenry.

An anti-American current runs through the American-Puerto Rican relationship. A nationalist reign of terror smoldered on the island in the thirties, culminating in the assassination of the American Chief of Police, Francis Riggs, in 1936 (Carr, 1984) and the reprisal shooting a year later of twenty Liberation Army marchers by the police. After a period of relative calm in the forties, violence returned in 1950. On October 30 of that year, an uprising on the island left 32 people dead. Two days later, two Puerto Ricans living in the United States made an attempt on the life of President Harry Truman. In March 1954, four Puerto Rican nationalists went on a shooting rampage in the gallery of the U.S. House of Representatives, wounding five Congressmen (Carr, 1984, pp. 162-173). More recently, in 1975, independence supporters blew up historic Frauncis Tavern in New York's financial district, leaving four dead in the rubble (New York Times, 1975). To this day, Don Pedro Albizu Campos, the Harvard-educated founder of the nationalist faction who consciously modeled his movement after that of Northern Ireland's revolutionary terrorists, is a national hero and the object of wide-spread adulation. His name is commemorated on numerous streets, schools and other island institutions.

The possibility of renewed violence hangs heavy but unspoken over the future of Puerto Rico - *and* of the United States.

Some advocates of statehood have openly capitalized on the island's potential to hasten the establishment of bilingualism on the mainland (Dillon, 1989). It is equally true, however, that as a state of the Union, Puerto Rico will feel strong pressures for increased integration into the mainstream culture, and will experience more English usage; it is predictable that such developments will be met with hostile moves to protect a romanticized version of the Spanish past.

Applying the lessons to be learned from Canada, one can anticipate an organized push to have Spanish legally recognized in *all the other states,* with demands that government at all levels—federal, state and local—deliver its services in Spanish to Puerto Ricans (and, coincidentally, to other Spanish-speakers) living in any of the other fifty states. In Canada, acceding to such demands in principle has led to a de facto bilingual Civil Service dominated by members of the French minority (Doern, 1985). Next came the call for exempting the "distinct society" represented by the people of Quebec Province from the constitutional restraints and responsibilities incumbent upon all other provinces in the Canadian federation. This extraordinary set of conditions, known as the Meech Lake Accords, was also swallowed by the political leadership in Ottawa and by the provincial Premiers, in the interest of preserving national unity. But its failure to win final ratification in the provincial parliaments has edged Canada closer to the brink of dissolution (Brown, 1990).

The Quebec experience, occurring as it does in a predominantly English-speaking country with a solid democratic tradition, counsels against rushing headlong into problems inherent in ingrained language divisions.

Statehood will give Puerto Ricans two Senators and several Representatives in the House. As there are no laws to prevent it, Congress could be used as a platform from which to assert Spanish language rights. It could follow that interpreters and translators would be introduced routinely into congressional proceedings, from which their use would spread rapidly to virtually every other public forum in the land.

Besides the installation on our shores of a Quebec-style intense cultural conflict, the history of U.S.-Puerto Rican relations also suggests the specter of renewed

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violence and terrorism, much like the permanent civil war that has gripped Northern Ireland for decades.

Should Puerto Rico become a state without extensive preparatory consensus building, both in Puerto Rico and in the United States, the 51st state may well bring an abrupt end to America's successful experiment in diversity within union. In its place, one risks creating a paradigm of ethnic nationalism that combines the virulent rhetoric of Quebec nationalism with the fratricide that periodically erupts on the streets of Belfast.

" . . . the people of both Puerto Rico and the United States (should be) made aware of issues now glossed over . . . "

A Role for Congress

The admission of states inhabited by persons who are culturally and linguistically different has taken place a number of times in our history and on the whole has been beneficial to the nation and to the new states. The cultural differences, though more profound and entrenched than was the case with other states, need not be an unsurmountable impediment to the acceptance of Puerto Rico into the Union. Nor is it necessary for the island to renege on its Spanish past in order to make a successful transition from political association to statehood. It is essential, however, that both the people of Puerto Rico and of the United States are made aware of issues now glossed over and are given ample opportunity to have input into the decision-making.

With the fresh example of resurgent aggressive nationalism in newlyfreed countries of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, a responsible preparatory process, to forestall disastrous mistakes, is of the essence.

For example, understanding the implications of statehood would be furthered by explicit attention to language policies. Thus, the legislation leading to a plebiscite on status should be substantially amended, to include key provisions now missing:

- A declaration that English is the official language of the United States. As such, that it is the language of spoken and written discourse and communication, of Congress, the Administration and all its agencies, and the Courts.
- A requirement that candidates for Congress and appointed federal officials must speak, read and understand the English language.
- A mandate that all oral and written communications between the federal government and states and local agencies, of any state, be in the English language.
- Assure the rights of English speaking residents in Puerto Rico to state services in the English language.
- Appropriate initial federal funding for improving the quality and extending the reach of English language instruction in Puerto Rico.

Further, it will be important to clarify that people who are residents of the mainland and consequently are entitled to vote in one of the states of the Union, will not be allowed to vote in the Puerto Rican plebiscite.

Finally—and most important—in view of the deep resentments against America that run through Puerto Rican twentieth century history, the Puerto Rican people must show decisive support in favor of admission into the Union of States. The ultimate folly would be to structure a plebiscite in which statehood could win by a slim majority, leaving the island bitterly divided and policy-makers without a mandate.

Recalling that the first plebiscite in 1967 was heavily boycotted by dissenting voters, statehood should require that at least sixty percent of the island's registered voters participate in the election, and that a minimum of two-thirds of those voting accept the option of Union.

Only with these significant changes, accompanied by a vigorous national debate on both sides of the ocean, can we hope to welcome Puerto Rico as our 51st state without annihilating our ideal of *E Pluribus Unum.*

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U.S. WORKERS SHOULD HAVE FIRST CLAIM ON AMERICAN JOBS

By Thomas R. Donahue,
Secretary-Treasurer, AFL-CIO

The AFL-CIO believes that reasoned consideration of our immigration policy requires a comprehensive approach that takes into account family-based admissions, and the need for admissions that further the interest in a diverse society.

It is in no sense anti-immigration, or anti-immigrant, to state that U.S. workers should have the first claim on U.S. jobs, and that U.S. wages and working conditions should not be undermined by workers from other lands. Such imported workers are all too readily exploitable—especially when they are here as temporary workers — since their continued access to this country is dependent upon the very employer who set those terms of employment. Recognizing the American workers' claim furthers fundamental fairness, our moral obligations to our fellow citizens and resident aliens, furthers social cohesion and contributes to our economic health.



We are told that this country now or in the near future faces labor shortages in parts of our economy. If true, that presents a real opportunity to achieve long overdue improvements in wages and working conditions and to facilitate the even longer overdue integration into the U.S. workforce of persons in our society who are now outside it, or inadequately inside it, and not by their choice: many in our inner cities, women, recent immigrants, persons with disabilities, older persons, and refugees. A sense that there is a "labor shortage" creates an opportunity to reach out to such individuals with education and training to permit them to take the jobs of the future. A rational immigration policy is one that provides an impetus to seizing this opportunity rather than allowing it to be lost in a short-sighted rush to import workers as a quick fix.

These considerations dictate that work-based admissions to this country must be limited to admissions based on a real need that cannot otherwise be met in the short term. Such a need must be demonstrated, not simply asserted.

Experience shows that this essential requirement will be met in fact as well as in theory only if Congress develops and enacts provisions that force the administration to follow congressional intent. it is no favor to anyone to leave the law so vague, so broad, or so lacking in standards that it provides no sure guidance and no curb on the greed of exploitative employers or the ingenuity of their lawyers.

Indeed, the day to day pressures to understand the rules that limit work-based admissions are so intense that a numerical limit on aliens who may be brought in to work is absolutely critical to a proper system that functions as Congress intended.

(Reprinted from INTERFACE, published by the AFL-CIO, Summer, 1990; vol. 19, No. 2)

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From his recent book, The New Realities, *we offer a portion of Peter Drucker's comments about the unique opportunities for service that are presented to Americans by that distinctive segment of our society, the "third sector." Copyright (c) 1989 by Peter F. Drucker. Reprinted by permission of Harper Collins Publishers.*

THE THIRD SECTOR: AMERICA'S NON-MARKET COUNTERCULTURE

By Peter Drucker

The counterculture of the "other half" in the knowledge society is one of social status and lifestyles. The other counterculture - so far purely American - is one of values. It is the counterculture of the non-business, non-government, "human-change agencies," the non-profit organizations of the so-called third sector.

American society has become different and distinct from other countries - developed or developing, free market or socialist - in the steady growth of its third sector, the thousands of non-profit but non-governmental institutions. These institutions include the majority of America's hospitals, a very large part of the schools, and an even larger percentage of colleges and universities. They include large international philanthropic organizations and very large domestic ones like the American Red Cross, with its thousands of local chapters and a million volunteers nationwide. They include many purely local ones, e.g., the community chests which support local charities in every American city and county, or the thousands of "Meals on Wheels" whose volunteers take hot lunches to the sick and elderly. They include large national health-care groups such as the American Heart Association, the American Lung Association, the American Mental Health Association. They include a great many community service groups: the Salvation Army, the Girl Scouts (which now enroll one out of every four American girls of elementary school age), the Boy Scouts, or the Urban League, the effective community service of America's black city dwellers. They include the enormous diversity of churches in the US ranging from those with more than 10,000 parishioners to conventicles with 25 members. And they include an indescribable variety of cultural enterprises - hundreds of symphony orchestras, for instance, and any number of museums. These institutions are paid mainly by fees and voluntary donations rather than tax dollars. They are independent and governed by their own volunteer boards. But even a good many tax-supported and governmental activities in the US are run like third-sector institutions - the public school, for instance, or the state universities and community colleges.

"One out of every two adult Americans - a total of 90 million people - are estimated to work as volunteers in the third sector . . . "

Third-sector institutions are not unknown in other countries. They occupy the "commanding heights" in Britain's education - what with the prep schools, the public schools, and the two prestige universities of Oxford and Cambridge. In Britain there are also the non-conformist churches. In Japan there are private universities and private non-governmental hospitals, many of them originally founded by Christian missionaries. The missionaries also gave Korea independent churches and schools affiliated with them. But few such institutions exist on the European continent. And even in Britain, Japan and Korea, they are confined to a few tasks. In the US they are ubiquitous. They fulfill a unique social function. They are a counterculture, different and separate from both the governmental and the business sectors and their respective values and cultures.

The third sector is actually the country's largest employer, though neither its work force nor the output it produces show up in the statistics. One out of every two adult Americans - a total of 90 million people - are estimated to work as volunteers in the third sector, most of them in addition to holding a paid job. These volunteers put in the equivalent of 7.5 million full-time work years. If they were paid, their wages would amount to $150 billion a year.

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These institutions, today, increasingly talk of the "independent sector" rather than the "third sector." But even that term begs the question of what function these institutions perform. Non-profit, non-business, non-governmental are all negatives. One cannot, however, define anything by what it is not. What, then, is it that all these institutions do? They all have in common - and this is a recent realization - that their purpose is to change human beings. The product of the hospital is a cured patient. The product of the church is a changed life. The product of the Salvation Army - the one organization that reaches the poorest of the poor regardless of race or religion - is a derelict become a citizen.

THIRD SECTOR CITIZENS

Increasingly, America's third sector creates a sphere of effective citizenship. One hears a good deal these days about the disintegration of community; the family, for instance, or the community of a small town. Traditional communities in all developed countries are weakening, except perhaps in Japan. But in the third sector new bonds of community are being forged.

Even more important may be the role of the third-sector institution in creating for its volunteers a sphere of meaningful citizenship. Now that the size and complexity of government make direct participation all but impossible, it is the human-change institution of the third sector that is offering its volunteers a sphere of personal achievement in which the individual exercises influence, discharges responsibility, and makes decisions. In the political culture of mainstream society, individuals, no matter how well educated, how successful, how achieving, or how wealthy, can only vote and pay taxes. They can only react, can only be passive. In the counterculture of the third sector, they are active citizens. This may be the most important contribution of the third sector. So far it is a purely American achievement.

In its American form, the third-sector institution can only flourish on American soil. No other country has the tradition of the frontier with its isolated communities forced to work together and to be self-sufficient, combined with the pluralism of self-governing churches, independent of state and government and therefore dependent on their congregations. No European culture, not even the closely knit Latin family, could nurture this kind of community. Only the radically different history of Japan has bequeathed a tradition of community that is comparable - in the "family" of the employing institution which translates the bonds of the feudal clan, the *han*, into the modern institution of government agency or business enterprise.

And still the knowledge society - with a social mobility that threatens to become rootlessness, with its "other half", its dissolution of the ties of farm and small town and their narrow horizons - needs community, freely chosen yet acting as a bond. It needs a sphere where the individual can become a master through serving. It needs a sphere where freedom is not just being passive, not just being left alone rather than being ordered around - a sphere that requires active involvement and responsibility.

We make a living by what we earn;
We make a life by what we give.

- Winston Churchill

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WE NEED A LINGUA FRANCA

By Barbara Mujica

Spanish is the language in which I conduct most of my personal, social and professional business. Furthermore, my entire career has been devoted to the promotion of Hispanic culture through teaching, writing, and directing a Spanish language theater group. There is nothing in the Constitution to prevent me from operating in a language other than English, and, if English becomes the official language of the United States, this situation will not change.

Opponents have misrepresented the goals of the movement to establish English as the official language of the United States by dubbing it the "English-only initiative." In reality, the officialization of English would not prohibit the use of other languages. All unofficial communication - such as family, religious, private or professional business - could be conducted in any language the participants preferred. Bilingual education would not be abolished, although the stress would be on mainstreaming students rather than maintaining their native languages. Emergency, health and safety services could continue to operate in languages other than English. Foreign-language publications and television and radio programs would not become illegal.

Foreign language teaching would not be diminished. In fact, U.S. English and other organizations that promote the confirmation of English as this country's official language encourage foreign language study. They recognize that knowledge of languages widens the cultural horizons of the individual and that the U.S.A. needs people who are fluent in other tongues to conduct diplomacy and business in the international arena.

Certainly there are valid reasons for supporting the drive to make English the official language of the United States. In a country comprised of myriad ethnic and linguistic groups, it is desirable to establish an official lingua franca, a vehicle that enables all of us to communicate with one another. Although it is possible to survive in almost any large American city without knowing English, in order to participate fully in the social, economic and political life of this country, English is essential.

Many argue that a person's patriotism is not dependent upon a knowledge of English. Yet, in order to carry out responsibly the duties of citizenship,a person must have access to major sources of information. Congress debates in English. The president addresses the nation in English. The large newspapers and news magazines use English. Without English, a person is dependent upon secondary sources - politicians and media that may or may not interpret the facts accurately. It is fair and logical that people who wish to exercise the rights of citizenship be required to do so in English.

Until recently, most immigrants have viewed mastery of English as a priority, but today, unprecedented numbers operate exclusively in another language. In areas of the Southwest, Florida, New York and Chicago, the English base is eroding, creating a subclass of people who do not possess a basic skill that they need in order to move up the economic ladder. In states such as California and Florida, it is possible to go through school and graduate without learning English. Yet, without English, youngsters will find it nearly impossible to go on to college or to obtain any but menial jobs. They will find themselves confined to a linguistic ghetto that offers limited opportunities.

The movement to officialize the English language in no way implies the dominance of a majority culture over minority cultures. Indeed, there is no ethnic majority in the United States. According to the 1980 census, less than 14 percent of all Americans are of British origin, which means that the AngloSaxons are as much in the minority as everyone else. The English initiative is simply a means of establishing one language, the de facto language of the United States, as the vehicle for making official communication.

Making English the official language of the United States would send a clear message that in order to reap the benefits of U.S. residency, it is essential to know English. It would dispel the illusion that it is possible to

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(Barbara Mujica is an associate professor of Spanish at Georgetown University in Washington, D.C. She is author or coauthor of more than 20 books on Hispanic culture, literature and language.)

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enjoy fully the advantages this country has to offer without learning the language.

But the point of officializing English is to strengthen our common bond, not to obliterate our individual identities. For millions of Americans, ethnicity and language are linked. Communicating in an ancestral tongue is a means of maintaining ties with the past. It is an affirmation of personal and collective identity. The Constitution guarantees freedom of expression, and one of the ways many of us express who we are is by speaking a foreign language.

Ethnic diversity is one of the greatest strengths of the United States. English should be our official language, but it should not be our only language.

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HOW MANY PEOPLE CAN EARTH SUPPORT?

By Jean-Michel Cousteau

In Thailand, in the waters off Ko Born Island, our divers encountered a rarely filmed ritual - the mating of squid. Each female entered a small hollow in the reef that served as a "group nursery" and deposited her eggs on the ceiling. Then the female exited and swam away, leaving the offspring to hatch unattended. Some would survive, others would be vanquished by forces of the ocean and predators.

The scene was mesmerizing, with the tiny eggs, luminous globules, hanging in clusters like lanterns in the sea.

One of the most miraculous aspects of our environment is the process of the creation of life, the inexorable cycle wherein organisms recreate themselves, programmed by nature to perpetuate their species. Reproduction biology, indeed, inspires awe.

In the case of humans, however, reproduction also inspires worry. The re-creation of human life, however beautiful, is now presenting us with global environmental challenges unknown before World War II. Consider some undeniable facts:

- By the year 2000, world population, now more than 5 billion, will exceed 6 billion, roughly equivalent to adding another China in just 10 years.

- In the 1950s, world population was roughly 2.5 billion. It took hundreds of thousands of years to reach that point. Since then, we have added more people than any generation since the first appearance of human beings on the planet.

- This amazing growth in human population has occurred along with increased industrialization, and improvement in living standards for some peoples. Thus, more people are consuming more resources.

For example, according to Dr. Nathan Kayfitz, a population expert affiliated with Harvard University, by the year 2025 there will be four times as many automobiles being driven on earth compared to the 500 million cars currently on the roads. The implication of this increased traffic alone on global warming, air quality, and energy consumption should be, in a word, frightening to anyone who takes a moment to think about it.

So, when one speaks of overpopulation today, one does not mean simply that there are too many people. One means that there are too many people to ensure that habitable areas remain habitable, and certainly too many people to ensure that untouched resources can be preserved for future generations.

If this were not so, we would not be destroying, for example, in a single lifetime, forests that have taken centuries to evolve and grow. Indeed, even in China, where population control is a high government priority, according to Dr. Paul Ehrlich, author of *The Population Explosion*, "Annual consumption of wood for building, paper and fuel remains 50 percent higher than regrowth, despite serious reforestation attempts."

And forest depletion is only one example of the ways humans are testing the capacity of the planet.

Once, environmental protection meant for most maintaining wide-open spaces, the great outdoors, scenic vistas, cuddly animals. Later, with more sophisticated understanding, environmental protection has come to mean preserving the delicate mechanisms of air, ocean, water, and land that make life possible on earth.

Today, however, environmentalism calls no longer exclude human population dynamics, for it is inescapably people - and our habits - that will determine whether what we try to protect can actually be saved. While we may admire and revere the exquisite miracle of reproduction, we would be fools if we allowed our reverence to erode our responsibility to bring children into a world suited to receive them, sustain them and help them prosper.

Unlike the young invertebrate squid, our offspring should not be left to fend for themselves. To ignore the links between population and environment is to do just that.

Our attention was drawn to this column in the Santa Barbara (Calif.) News-Press. It appeared August 25, 1990. Copyright (c) 1990, The Cousteau Society. Distributed by the Los Angeles Times Syndicate. Reprinted by permission.

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SKILL MISMATCHES CHARACTERIZE THE LABOR MARKET IN THE 1990s

By Doris Meissner
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Historically, immigration has played a central role in the U.S. economy and is a fundamental part of today's labor market profile. So it is perhaps inevitable that anxiety about labor market shortages and skills gaps leads some to conclude that immigration can resolve the economic problems of the 1990s. This is a mistake that can only create further difficulties, both for the economy and for our competitive position.

Labor shortages present different prospects for different actors in the marketplace. For employers, they slow growth, intensify inflationary pressures and threaten technological leadership and international competitiveness. For U.S. workers, labor shortages translate into better job options, higher wages, more promotions, and improved working conditions, especially for women, ethnic and racial minorities, trade-displaced workers, and the handicapped. Immigration can mitigate the deleterious effects of shortages for employers and dilute the potential for improvements they represent for workers.

For the nation, shortages represent a special challenge because they arise rarely in economic history and offer relatively short-lived opportunities to promote the well-being of U.S. workers, at a time when the productivity of the overall economy must be stimulated.

The most recent labor force projections should change somewhat the sense of impending crisis. The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) projects that labor force growth will, indeed, continue to slow as the smaller, baby-bust generation follow their baby-boom parents into the workforce. The projected growth rate in the labor force for the 1990s is 1.2 percent annually, only modestly slower than the rate of labor force increase we have experienced in the 1980s. Assuming either current or the Senate's proposed increases in levels of immigration, newcomers will increase their share of labor force growth above the 22% contribution they have made in the 1980s.

But the new projections also report several points that are especially important for the immigration debate: apparent scarcities of young workers will likely abate during the end of the decade; gaps between job requirements and educational proficiencies of college-educated workers may be narrowing; and an important area of shortage may involve the rapid growth of jobs that require post-secondary training but not college degrees, a problem that would diminish by lowering the high secondary school dropout rate.

These indices provide an optimistic outlook. Slower labor force growth and an economy producing a large number of jobs could lower unemployment rates to levels not reached in the past two decades. But this bright economic future remains threatened by skills and educational imbalances. The picture is one of serious, pervasive skill mismatches that flow directly from inadequate educational preparation of U.S. workers. The deficiencies run deep and have been extensively documented.

In addition to the problem of skill mismatches, uneven geographical distribution of economic growth is also a source of labor shortages. 1990s trends are likely to reinforce this uneven pattern. Half of the new jobs that will be created by 2000 are estimated to be in the 55 largest cities. The escalating concentration of high-tech jobs in limited numbers of geographic locations exhausts labor pools in local areas and outstrips affordable housing, another feature of geographical mismatches in the labor force.

Finally, imbalances between work and workers are combining to create a polarization of the American economy, its workforce and society. This economic polarization means a widening income and opportunity gap between majority and minority groups. Blacks and Hispanics will continue to increase their share of the labor force in the 1990s. Yet, they are overrepresented in occupations with the slowest rate of projected growth, underrepresented in jobs that have the fastest growth future, and are concentrated geographically in a small number of central cities suffering from severe economic and social problems.

The role of immigration in the 1990s, then, must be understood in the context of severe skill mismatches,

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uneven distribution and regional concentration of growth and jobs, and widening opportunity and performance gaps. The shortages we are experiencing are not shortages in absolute numbers. They are shortages of properly trained people in various places for particular kinds of jobs. As such, the shortages will be partially corrected by market forces. More importantly, they can be overcome by aggressive public and private investment in human capital improvements.

If immigration is substantially increased, in the name of addressing labor shortages or for other reasons, it could seriously weaken the economic and political forces necessary to bring about the wholesale education and training improvements that are required to compete effectively and advance domestic well-being.

Arriving at an immigration policy for the 1990s that does not undermine the readjustment required to refit the American workforce for a new era of economic competition requires careful attention to the role that contemporary immigration plays in the labor market and the economy.

The relation between immigration and the labor market and economy is complex and highly uneven. Immigrants are concentrated in relatively few states and metropolitan areas, and they work in only selected industrial sectors. This makes it difficult to assess the effect of admitting more immigrants in a swiftly changing, national labor market. The traditional goals of immigration policy embodied in family reunification, refugee resettlement and labor market needs overlap and interact rather than function as separate streams

Where immigration selection is concerned, the current system affords employers access to intending immigrants who possess needed skills and experience when American workers are not available. Preserving this dynamic is an important element in fashioning a selection system that is consistent with encouraging needed labor market readjustment in the future.

(Reprinted from INTERFACE published by the AFL-CIO, Summer, 1990; vol. 19, No. 2. We thank Dr. Vernon Briggs for bringing the items from INTERFACE to our attention.)

ERRATA

You may want to make the following corrections

in your copy of the Fall issue of

THE SOCIAL CONTRACT

p. 10	col. 2,	line 3	" . . . but has serious . . ."
p. 18	col. 1,	line 25	" . . . Sephardic majority . . ."
p. 20	col. 2,	line 24	"for each 100 self-employed white-collar Ashkenazi professionals . . ."
p. 28	col. 1,	line 18	" . . . not through occasional . . ."

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IMMIGRATION CELEBRATION: IS THE EXPERIENCE STILL RELEVANT?

By Richard Bernstein

The speeches have been delivered now and the covering cloths pulled off the gleaming copper Wall of Remembrance, but as Ellis Island formally opened to the public yesterday (9/10/90), a question about the meaning of it all hung in the air.

It was this: What exactly, in 1990, a year of considerable racial antagonism and a growing ethnic assertiveness, is Ellis Island a memorial to?

The speeches, by the likes of Vice President Quayle and Lee A. Iacocca of Chrysler, tended to equate the former immigration reception center near the Statue of Liberty with the American experience itself. Ellis Island, they said, was the place where millions of ordinary people did an extraordinary thing: They started new lives in a new place, and in so doing, they forged a new identity, the American one.

But given today's ethnic frictions and the country's present tendency toward a de facto separatism, it can be asked: Is the new museum a monument to an America of the past, or even an imaginary America - a kind of Williamsburg of New York Harbor? Or does the symbolism of Ellis Island, its status as a point of entry not just to a country but to a new identity, still hold its force even in these days of ethnic assertiveness?

These are complicated questions with no clear answer during these days of remembrance, reflection and no small measure of sentimentality.

Common Identity Questioned

But if a simple answer is possible, it would probably be something like this: Since Ellis Island closed, we have become a far more diverse and heterogeneous society than we ever were before, so much so that the very idea of a common identity seems at times threatened. In this sense, the opening of the Ellis Island Museum just now rings with a certain dissonance. And yet, even in the prevailing mood of intense ethnic consciousness, the historic immigration to these shores continues, and many people are becoming Americans in much the same fashion as previous waves of immigrants.

What was Ellis Island anyway?

Among the proudest parts of the newly restored island is a long copper wall on which some 200,000 names of former immigrants - from Agnes Abrahamson to Ferra Zyziak - are inscribed. Passage through Ellis Island was not required for inclusion on the wall; all that was needed was a donation in the immigrant's name. Still, the wall is in one sense a physical symbol of the melting pot, with its vast mixture of national origins, its English, Swedish, Polish, Jewish, Italian, Greek and other names. But black Americans or Asian-Americans visiting the wall would probably find few names directly relevant to them.

European, White Immigration

The wall is evidence that Ellis Island belonged to a specific time in American history. It was the time of the huge influx of European, white immigrants that took place in the first half of this century. And it was a time when the new arrivals accepted as a matter of course the need to adapt to a culture and a language that was not their own, to take on a new identity as part of achieving the American dream.

James P. Shenton, a professor of history at Columbia University, has pointed out that this willingness reflected the narrowness of the melting pot concept. Not only were Asians and blacks largely excluded then, but there was also plenty of prejudice against Southern and Eastern Europeans, the feeling being that they would not melt in very well.

Americanness was defined basically as a more rugged version of western European, particularly British, culture, and that definition was largely accepted by the new immigrants.

To be sure, in private life many of the immigrants remained "beyond the melting pot" - as such scholars of American ethnicity as Nathan Glazer and Daniel Patrick Moynihan wrote long ago. They kept their customs, they often married among each other, they marched in their parades. Still, the Ellis Island immigrants did not contest the idea that a new national identity would supersede the private identity. They implicitly accepted what the 18th century Frenchman, Hector St. John de

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Crevecoeur - writing in English, not in French - called "The American, this new man."

Hostility to Melting Pot

By contrast, the late 1980s and the early 1990s are clearly a time when the national mood is in many ways hostile to the melting pot concept. The stress these days is not on Crevecoeur's shedding of "ancient prejudices and manners," but on the search for roots, the ethnic reaffirmation.

The atmosphere is full of ethnic antagonism, with crime and its punishment in particular becoming an arena of racial enmity as has happened several times recently in New York with incidents in Bensonhurst, Howard Beach and Central Park. The racial antagonisms are not new, but they bring a new element with them, an often aggressive ethnic self-assertiveness, a desire not to melt into the whole but to see the whole as a patchwork of irreconcilably separate groups.

A goal of the civil rights movement of the 1960s, to erase differences, has given way to a tendency noticeable among the more militant members of minority groups to stand apart from the formerly oppressive white majority, to assert their cultural and ethnic differences.

Various groups are pressing for things like bilingual education, not, as was originally intended, to help foreign children learn English, but to maintain their native languages and cultures. Across the country, there are ever more ethnic studies programs, more demands that history texts be re-written, more protests urging the hiring of minority faculty members. At the universities, there are demands for what is being called "multiculturalism," and a concept that the "white Anglo-Saxon culture" has maintained a kind of "hegemony" over other cultures.

Most fundamentally, there is the sense in some quarters that there is no such thing as an American identity or alternatively, that the American identity is just another name for the white Anglo-Saxon identity; beyond that, there is a separate African-American identity, or a Hispanic identity, or an Asian-American identity.

The question now seems to be how the new assertiveness - it has been called a "new tribalism" by some commentators - will mix with another unmistakable current phenomenon, namely the continued arrival of huge numbers of immigrants.

Today in New York there are probably more foreign-born residents than there were in the 1930s. The city has something like 60 foreign-language newspapers. Across the country in Los Angeles, more than half the children in the public school system are Hispanic. Nearly 30 percent of the incoming freshmen in the vast University of California system are Asians. A new immigration law being considered by Congress now would allow 750,000 people into the country each year. (Editor's note: The Immigration Bill passed by Congress on October 27 placed the numbers at 700,000 annually through 1994 with a supposed drop to 675,000 thereafter.)

Rapid Upward Mobility

There are worries that the stress on "multiculturalism" will erode the "transformative" qualities of America and create, instead of unity out of diversity, a new Tower of Babel (to paraphrase historian Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.). If that happens, Ellis Island will certainly be a memorial to an America that no longer exists.

Yet, there is plenty of evidence that many of the new arrivals are taking advantage of America's opportunities in much the same way that their predecessors did.

In this sense, the dream remains what it was for those who came to Ellis Island - to be free and to get rich. Realizing the dream has never been easy, not for the Ellis Islanders and not for the immigrants coming today. Yet plenty are realizing it, and that is a sign, despite the fading of the melting pot ideal, that the history commemorated at the new Immigration Museum is still being made today.

(Mr. Bernstein's column appeared in THE NEW YORK TIMES on September 11, 1990 and is reprinted here with permission.)

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Reportage

THE IMMIGRATION DEBATES OF THE 1990s; SECURE PERSONAL IDENTIFICATION CONFERENCE

By Robert Kyser

Two noteworthy conferences were held in the nation's capital in late October and early November considering issues being followed by THE SOCIAL CONTRACT. "The Immigration Debates of the 1990s" were held on October 26th and brought together some of the major protagonists of the topic.

The first debate featured Otis Graham, Distinguished Professor of History at the University of California at Santa Barbara, and Julian Simon, professor of marketing at the University of Maryland.

Julian Simon elicited audible groans from the audience with his pronouncements that "the economics of large-scale immigration is not debatable," that is: it is always good; "natural resources are becoming more available, not less, and the environment is getting steadily cleaner." He went on to affirm that we know more and more about how things work and our economy can keep absorbing as many immigrants as want to come.

Over against this irrepressible optimism, Otis Graham brought a note of realism about the fact that our economy is not poised on the edge of expansion as it was in the late 1930s, and we must shift our attention to literacy and numeracy, not just raw numbers. Current immigration, adding illegal to legal, does indeed have an adverse impact on the environments: natural, cultural and economic. We have only to look at the statistics for California to realize what the future holds: 500 million Americans by 2020. The California fertility rate, being affected by illegal immigration, is already up to 2.3 and rising.

Michael Teitelbaum, a demographer who served with the U.S. Commission for the Study of International Migration and Cooperative Economic Development, debated Ben Wattenberg of the American Enterprise Institute. Wattenberg's thesis is that immigration enhances business; that by its very nature an economy is constantly growing and therefore needs immigration; that America's greatest asset is the fact that people want to come here. Teitelbaum's research as a demographer reveals that there is no significant relationship between population increase and economic growth. He contends that nationalist economists and militarists have always feared low population growth, but we must be cautious about numbers, especially in an era that demands such high levels of skill for "making it."

"Without assimilation citizenship is only a legalism." -- Richard Estrada

Richard Estrada of *The Dallas Morning News* is an accomplished speaker who made his points well: without assimilation citizenship is only a legalism; the inability to *write* English is an important deficit for Mexican immigrants; established Hispanics are adversely affected by the influx of impoverished Mexicans; and America's media and political leadership are not paying enough attention to the tensions between established Hispanics and the illegals. On the other side of this question of "assimilation" was Arnoldo Torres, a consultant to the Hispanic organizations, based in Sacramento. He spoke from the viewpoint of "victimization": that Hispanics have been oppressed by the "pressure-cooker" style of assimilation and it is a failed policy for which we are still suffering the consequences. Torres maintains that the melting pot was only a dream and that the Anglo ideal is still the defining one. He castigated the conference leadership for an absence of Hispanics in the audience. (Those responsible for planning the debates later reported that many Hispanic groups had indeed been invited to send representatives and had chosen not to do so.)

On the question "Can America Humanely Secure Its Borders?" Leonel Castillo and Alan Nelson proved to be excellent spokesmen for the issue being the Commissioners of Immigration and Naturalization under the Carter and Reagan administrations, respectively. Mr. Castillo advocates more cooperation with diplomatic

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sources in the sending countries to provide for preclearance of migrants, border crossing-cards for frequent movements across the border for business purposes, the creation of transborder "enterprise zones" in such bi-national urban areas as Juarez-El Paso, with immigration inspections concentrating on people leaving such zones rather than at the border itself. He also had a list of programs that would make detention centers more humane and provide for education in hygiene and family planning, more rapid hearings, and the creation of a trust fund for welfare and emergencies with fees charged to immigrants. He thought it would be beneficial to require industries that plan to hire immigrants or guest workers to first file an "impact statement" such as would be required in the area of environment concerns.

Castillo seemed not to address the issue of what to do about illegal entries but this was the thrust of former-Commissioner Nelson's remarks. When there is a national will to curtail illegal immigration, humane ways can be found. He gave the examples of the Mariel boatlift and the Haitian influx. It is important that a country based on laws not countenance illegal entry since it so undercuts our values. Mr. Nelson is also interested in the naturalization process. He feels that we need systematic border enforcement, employer sanctions that curtail the hiring of illegals, speedy deportation of those in violation, and a solution to problems of document fraud. Nelson advocates a multi-faceted approach to control of illegal immigration that takes American interests into account.

The fifth and final debate was between Dan Stein of the Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR) and Michael Maggio, a leading immigration attorney based in Washington. Maggio used the theme "What are we teaching arrivals about the American structure of democracy?" to comment negatively about INS rules and procedures. Mr. Stein countered with references to the need to instruct arrivals about citizenship. He cited the simplicity of the questionnaire for naturalization as a case-in-point, and as a bow in the direction of strictly economic criteria for admission. "We have a vacuum in the definition of citizenship" he said, indicating that we ought to have concerns about the fate of our environment, should uphold such goals as family planning, and we ought to be able to ask at least for a pledge to uphold the American Constitution as a condition for obtaining a green card.

* * * *

In the same way that Ira Mehlman of the FAIR staff is to be commended for the assembly of five pairs of debaters who were worthy of the topics in the "Immigration Debates of the 1990s," so must we acknowledge the skill of David Simcox, Executive Director of the Center for Immigration Studies (CIS), in assembling a panel of international experts in Washington on November 1-2 for a conference on "Secure Personal Identification: Balancing Security, Efficiency and Privacy." Conferees included: Kevin O'Conner, the Privacy Commissioner of Australia; Camille Rochefort from Canada's Department of Immigration and Employment and Gerry Montigny from the Canadian Privacy Commission; Ms. Louise Cadoux, a Counselor with the National Commission for Informatics and Civil Liberties in France; Dr. Edgar Friedrich of Germany's Criminal Identification Bureau; Mr. Manabu Hatakeyama, Japanese Consul in New York; Charles Olde Kalter from the Netherlands Ministry of the Interior; Professor Knut Selmer, Norwegian Research Center for Computers and Law; Nikolay Parshenko, a Consul with the Soviet Embassy in Washington; and David McDonough who is the Deputy Chief Inspector for the Immigration and Nationality Department in the United Kingdom. The United States was represented by George Trubow of the Center for Informatics Law at the John Marshall Law School.

In his luncheon address Pete Velde, a Consultant to Senator Robert Dole on Identification and a former Director of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, discussed the coming revolution in identification technology and the legislative proposals for making a secure, standardized state driver's license into the country's basic ID document.

"It became apparent that the United States is the most lax and relaxed about its identification systems."

Each participant had prepared a short paper addressing each of several topics to be considered, entering into dialogue with each other and with audience members as time allowed. It became clear at the outset that despite the difference between common law countries and those with the tradition of the Napoleonic Code, there was awareness of collecting too much data in one place with the threat to privacy that cross-referenced and instantly available information poses (the "big brother is watching" phobia). It also became

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apparent that the United States is the most lax and relaxed about its identification systems, and while Americans deplore the idea of government collections of data, they seem little concerned that the private sector is the most skilled and diligent collector of information about individuals.

In the U.S. we have a de facto national registration card, namely the driver's license or its equivalent issued by the several states. The problem is that the identity it attests to is not as secure as it could be. It is much too easy to obtain a false or borrowed birth record and "breed" other documents with it. The other industrialized countries seem much more able than the U.S. to identify their citizens and those who have been granted the right to work as a guest of the country, and to discover those who have violated immigration procedures.

Law Professor Trubow seemed to set forth the best principles by which to consider the subject of secure personal identification: "I should be able to keep my identity confidential when I may (except when social order demands revelation), I should be able to establish my identity when I must, and the system of security should be able to guarantee my use of what belongs to me, unavailable to someone else."

There were extensive presentations of technologies now in use and those in the offing for the creation of tamper-proof identification. It seems that the technology is at hand that will be based on biometrics (e.g.DNA) and that will not require any document, just a sensor that one may or may not be aware of.

For further information about these two excellent events contact either the office of the Federation for American Immigration Reform, 1666 Connecticut Ave. NW, Washington DC 20036, for copies of the videos of the Immigration Debates; or the Center for Immigration Studies for copies of the papers presented at the Secure Personal Identification conference. You may contact CIS at 1424 16th St. NW, Washington DC 20036.

Letters to the Editor

We received several brief notes congratulating us on the inception of THE SOCIAL CONTRACT. One writer lamented the absence of the word "environment" in our list of related issues to which we respond that the multiplier effects of population on the national and world environment are exactly at the center of our concerns.

We hope that a "Letters to the Editor" section will eventually become a forum for significant debate on the issues of population growth, migration, assimilation and the well-being of the American society. Your letters will be most welcome.

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Kathryn Bricker, former Executive Director of U. S. ENGLISH, reviews a book about bilingual education which challenges the politics as well as the educational soundness of bilingual programs in the public schools.

A SEVERE PROBLEM OF UNDER-EDUCATION

A Book Review

FORKED TONGUE: THE POLITICS OF BILINGUAL EDUCATION By Rosalie Pedalino Porter

Written from the heart by someone who experienced firsthand the trials and rewards of adopting a new language with a new land, this is a must-read for an insider's perspective on bilingual education. Rosalie Porter, who struggled to learn English while raised in an Italian home, has dedicated her professional life to helping others master the English language. Experiences gained as bilingual teacher, then Director of Bilingual and English As a Second Language programs in Newton, Massachusetts, combined with her exhaustive study of educational theory and research, language-learning in other nations, and her analysis of the political debate, make this book a powerful weapon in the hands of people concerned about the future quality of our democratic nation.



For, as this debate illustrates, education is both that important and tied to politics. Government officials have long recognized that education has a political end: that of forming ideal citizens. Statesmen of old, said Aristotle, have "taken very great care about making citizens have a certain character." Dr. Porter reminds us anew: "In America, nationhood is based not on race or ethnic or tribal identity, but on a set of beliefs about liberty, equality, and individual rights."

Yet, politics has penetrated the practice of bilingual education in the reverse direction, harming both the students and our society. Here's just one example of the damage inflicted on Limited English Proficient students: "In 1986 the Boston School Department revealed that several hundred students (who) had been in bilingual classrooms for seven years...still had not learned enough English to be enrolled in a class taught in English."

Instead of statesmen, the dominant figures now are self-interested professional ethnics who preach the antithesis of civil rights by demanding separate but equal programs. A lone and unheard Hispanic civil rights leader of the 1970s, Alfredo Mathew, cautioned "bilin-

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gualism (may) foster a type of apartheid that will generate animosities with others." We now see this happening in the cities and schools around us.

As Dr. Porter explains: "The expectation of cultural pluralists that we may nurture concentrations of different cultures and languages and maintain them successfully in the United States is unrealistic and could only be accomplished either by government policies that most Americans would find offensive or by self-segregation of communities...Neither course seems to have wide appeal." Rather, her ideal is represented in an answer to Bill Moyers recently when he asked San Francisco-based Hispanic author Richard Rodriguez what ethnicity he considers himself. His answer was quintessentially American: "The longer I live here, the more I feel increasingly Chinese."

Dr. Porter's challenge is to inform lawmakers and the public what is really happening in bilingual education, in an urgent call for reform. That such public awareness will make a difference is implied by a National Institute of Education study presented in the March 1990 Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. It reported that "opposition (to bilingual programs) is greater among the well-informed, suggesting that opposition may increase further as the issue attains greater national visibility. It also increases if bilingual education is presented as promoting linguistic and cultural maintenance among language-minority students rather than as a mechanism for teaching English."

Here's where Ms. Porter lays it on the line exceptionally well: "The basic misleading propositions come down to two. First, it is essentially dishonest to hold out the promise that development of native language skills for several years will lead to better learning of English. Second, pushing home-language-maintenance bilingual education programs as a means of making disadvantaged, limited-English students "balanced bilinguals" draws classroom time and resources away from the more urgent educational needs of these children. Fostering the notion that full bilingualism can be easily achieved at no cost to the development of English or of subject matter learning is surely a deception that effectively hardens class divisions along linguistic lines. Delaying the early learning of English while teaching subject matter in the native language clearly will inhibit the students' later development of the English language."

Despite the vigor of her presentation, it is unfortunate that Dr. Porter, in the chapter on political extremes, fails to recognize the virtual absence of extremes. While many people promote non-U.S. cultural maintenance at all costs, no one is seriously calling for a return to the "sink or swim" method of education, abandoning these children to chance or untrained teachers. Rather, the battle is between a separatist left and the middle. U.S.ENGLISH as an organization has fought consistently for the 'radical' center: that the first priority of "bilingual education" should be teaching the language of social and economic progress. The contrast in viewpoint was illustrated by a Mexican American Legal Defense Fund representative who, at a June 1989 conference of Latino elected officials, expounded on the "historical use of English in the United States as a tool of oppression."

Ms. Porter's final chapter, "Decisions For the Future," is a masterpiece of sensible program recommendations: "If you want children to learn another language really well, start them at an early age and give them lots of concentrated professional attention. But this makes sense only if you are more concerned with a child's civil *right to the opportunity for self-fulfillment* than with the self-interested, and thus *segregative, agenda of political activists"* (emphasis added). Her artful approach to this conclusion is uplifting reading.

WE WELCOME SUBMISSION OF ARTICLES

TO BE CONSIDERED FOR REPRINTING

We encourage readers who come across items that deal with our general subject areas (please see our statement of purpose) to send them on to us. We, of course, cannot use all items -- permission to reprint as well as costs to do so are sometimes a factor -- but we welcome all help in surveying the huge but widely scattered literature in our field.

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Is the nation-state still a valid notion? The concept is essential to the idea of national borders, and to the legitimacy of controlling migration across them. Part of the opposition to the regulation of immigration traces to the idea that national borders are no longer tenable. On this point we are pleased to present Michael Walzer's review of E. J. Hobsbawm's new book, NATIONS AND NATIONALISM SINCE 1780: PROGRAMME, MYTH, REALITY. *Mr. Walzer is a Fellow at the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton, and an Associate Editor at* THE NEW REPUBLIC. *This review, which appeared in the issue of August 13, 1990, is reprinted by permission of* THE NEW REPUBLIC, *(c) 1990, The New Republic, Inc.*

A WORLD WITHOUT BORDERS?

A Book Review

NATIONS AND NATIONALISM SINCE 1780: PROGRAMME, MYTH, REALITY By E. J. Hobsbawm

A year ago Eric Hobsbawm published a collection of his political essays over the last decade called *Politics For a Rational Left.* Reading them, I never doubted that they served the cause of leftist rationality. No one has looked at British politics with a clearer eye. In his critique of Thatcherism, his opposition to the "hard left," his refusal of Labourite sentimentality, his sensible strategic proposals, Hobsbawm has provided a model of intellectual engagement. But rational leftists have always had trouble with nationalism, and this new book is a catalog of Hobsbawm's troubles.

It is organized as a work of historical scholarship, and the survey of nationalist politics since the French Revolution is brilliantly done. Hobsbawm is a master of reference; his narrative is rich with examples drawn from the history of every nation, proto-nation, and would-be nation on the European continent. (He has little to say about the rest of the world.) But for reasons that go to the heart of his troubles, he tells no extended stories. His examples are like witnesses at a trial, called to the stand, asked a few questions, hastily dismissed; they are not allowed, as it were, to speak for themselves. This is historical scholarship with a polemical purpose. Hobsbawm wants us to reach a verdict on nationalism: that its program is wrong, its myths dangerous, its reality ugly.

Myth is the dominant idea. The immediate point of Hobsbawm's survey is that the claims that modern nationalists make when they demand statehood and sovereignty are false. Above all, the nation is not an ancient community. Nationalism, according to Hobsbawm, rarely reflects a long-term tradition or a coherent way of life. Nor is it necessarily founded on a common language, or religion, or ethnicity, or historical experience. All these are more often the result of sovereignty than its reason: they are social artifacts, political constructions. The nation is an imagined (and, what is more, a newly imagined) community.

"Imagined community" is a phrase that Hobsbawm takes from the Cornell anthropologist Benedict Anderson, who, in his own book on nationalism, nowhere used it as a term of disparagement. But Hobsbawm seems to think that imagined communities serve ineffectively and inauthentically "to fill the emotional void left by the retreat or disintegration . . . of *real* human communities" (his italics). What these real communities were he does not tell us, and I have some difficulty imagining them. I can only imagine imagined (not the same as imaginary) communities - Christendom and Islam, say, or ancient Israel and ancient Rome.

Surely the unity of Saxons and Normans, of Scottish clans and Russian villages, was imagined. How could it not be? Except perhaps for mothers and children there are no natural ties among human beings. Even the family, or at least every particular structure of familial relationships, is imagined. Relationships depend on ideas; relationships *are* ideas. My connection to a blood relative in Miami is no less a function of my imagination than my connection to fellow Americans in Wyoming or fellow Jews in Romania. Saying this does not reduce the force or the value of the connections; I have a rich imagination. So does everybody else.

Hobsbawm assumes the disvalue of imagined communities. That's why he spends so many pages demonstrating that the nation has no consistent origin in *real* communal life. He dispels all the myths, and as a

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result the phenomena become incomprehensible. Why is the nation such a powerful focus for thoughts and feelings, energy and commitment? At one point in his book, Hobsbawm asks a related question: Why did the left, during and after World War II, make such an effort to appropriate national and patriotic symbols? The point, he says, was "to refuse the devil's armies the monopoly of the best marching tunes." That is nicely put, but why *were* those the best marching tunes, the tunes to which people were most ready to march? This I don't think Hobsbawm ever explains. He writes as if men and women calling themselves nationalists are making a conceptual mistake misunderstanding what a nation is - or falling into the darkness of unreason. One senses throughout the book that Hobsbawm is irritated by nationalism, like a respectable citizen confronting someone else's bad habits or nervous tics.

He would like to tell us that some group of people (the lower-middle-class intelligentsia is the most likely candidate: journalists, schoolteachers, provincial civil servants) perpetrated nationalism on everyone else. But he is much too good a historian for an argument like that. And so he makes the argument only while warning us against it, as in this discussion of language:

> *I do not wish to reduce linguistic nationalism to a question of jobs, as vulgar materialistic liberals used to reduce wars to a question of the profits of armament firms. Nevertheless it cannot be fully understood, and the opposition to it even less, unless we see the vernacular languages as, among other things, a vested interest of the lesser examination-passing classes.*

Yes, the lesser examination-passers (note the contempt) are important imaginers of the nation, carriers of nationalist ideology, political construction workers. But what they are able to make depends, in ways that Hobsbawm obscures as often as he clarifies, on what they have to work with. He quotes with approval a line from a nineteenth century Italian nationalist: "We have made Italy, now we have to make Italians." What Hobsbawm admires here is the frank admission that Italy was first made in the absence of Italians - that is, of a unified ethnic and linguistic group with a singular history. But this is a halftruth, as we can see if we reflect on how much easier it was to make Italians out of Neapolitans, Romans and Milanese than out of Libyans and Ethiopians.

Nations are imagined communities constructed out of the remains of earlier imagined communities. The construction is partly political, therefore coercive, but it is easier or harder, more coercive or less coercive, depending on what we might think of as the nearness of the old and new imaginings. Machiavelli, one of the early imaginers of the Italian nation, has a nice image in *The Prince* of one political change leaving a "toothing-stone" for the next: a point of possible connection. Previous political changes, up and down the peninsula, had left their toothingstones for Italian nationalism. Had they not done that, there would never have been an Italian nation but some other, or several others. These connections to the past don't make Italian nationalism real in Hobsbawm's sense, but they do explain why we are inclined to regard it as a legitimate politics, whereas the effort to make Italians out of Libyans or Frenchmen out of Algerians was illegitimate.

Hobsbawm never asks why people think of themselves as members of a community. He tells us more than once that imagining a nation is mostly a matter of reaction and resentment, a response to imperial domination, foreign threat, or immigrant pressure. Half-true, again; but the persistence of these imaginings, across a variety of kinds of communities, suggests something deeper. Deeper, but also very simple: there is, I think, a fairly ordinary human desire to live in a familiar world with known others, and to establish some sort of continuity over the generations ("between those who are living, those who are dead, and those who are yet to be born," as Edmund Burke wrote). The forms of the familiarity vary a great deal. Even modern nations, with their interchangeable ideologies, are variously constructed out of ethnic, linguistic, religious, and historical commonalities. There is no pattern, as Hobsbawm amply demonstrates. Any given common feature may or may not make for nationalistic imaginings. Particular imaginings may or may not express themselves in a successful, let alone an attractive, politics.

Old and new communities have been under stress for a long time now. Economic mobilizations, mass migrations, and largescale warfare have thrust masses of men and women into unfamiliar worlds where they find no toothing-stones, no easy connection. The people upon whom they have been thrust respond to the newcomers, often enough, with fear and hostility. For these (and other) reasons, nationalist politics often turns ugly, much like religious politics and class politics in similar circumstances.

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Hobsbawm makes nationalism ugly by definition, for he holds that its central principle is that duty to the nation overrides every other political and moral duty. (Hence committed nationalists can never be trusted to write the history of their own nation: they will tell the truth only when it suits their purposes. He himself, Hobsbawm assures us, suffers no such disability.) But this is like saying that the central principle of individualism is that the self always takes precedence over the other. Individualism is egotism. Nationalism is chauvinism. Why does our language have different words for such singular phenomena? In fact, the second term in both these false equations expresses a possibility, perhaps a tendency, but not an identity. It is important to recognize exactly when nationalism turns into chauvinism and under what conditions - so that we can try to avoid the transition or reverse it. Assume the identity and there is nothing to do with all the perverse men and women who think of themselves as members of a nation.

This assumption of perversity leads Hobsbawm into a strange argument about recent events in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. "We can now see in melancholy retrospect," he writes, that "it was the great achievement of the Communist regimes in multinational countries to limit the disastrous effects of nationalism within them." On his own reading, the right verb here is probably "postpone" rather than "limit." But at what price was this postponement won? A price worth paying, he seems to suggest: "The 'discrimination' or even 'oppression' against which champions of various Soviet nationalities abroad protest is far less than the expected consequences of the withdrawal of Soviet power." To this sentence he attaches a note saying that it is not to be read, as it easily might be, "as condoning the mass transfer of entire populations on the grounds of their nationality." But if he acknowledges the brutality of the Stalinist transfers, he ought to take "oppression" out of inverted commas: it was real enough. Where are the Lithuanian or Armenian nationalists who have anything like that in mind?

Despite these grim expectations, Hobsbawm is remarkably optimistic about the future - and remarkably confident about his own ability to read the future. Nationalism "is no longer a major vector of historical development." History is still, it seems, on the side of moral and political progress. We are well on our way to a supranational, even a global, society and economy. There will be many years still of nationalist resistance and adaptation; nations and ethnic-linguistic groups may even flourish "locally," though now in "subordinate and . . . minor roles." National identity will continue to be one (but only one among many) of the ways in which people imagine and describe themselves. But all this is somehow trivial when set against the overriding certainty of decline.

Since I have no similar knowledge of the future, I cannot say yes or no to this prognosis. But even if Hobsbawm is right about world politics, he is wrong about the relative importance of nationalist resistance, local flourishing, and imagined identities. He is making a mistake characteristic of rational leftism, a mistake that has done a lot of damage on the left generally. We can see the mistake at work in the radical critique of "consumerism," as if it were not a good thing for ordinary men and women to possess useful and beautiful objects (as the rich and powerful have always done). When possession becomes the sole end of their existence, there is something to criticize; but we need to mark off that moment from all previous moments of innocent desire and acquisition.

Hobsbawm expresses a similar disdain for the ordinary in his critique of nationalism - as if the forms of human fellowship are not of vital and permanent importance. When fellowship (of any sort) becomes exclusive, paranoid, and aggressive, there is something to criticize. But we have to be able to recognize value short of that. Indeed, the chief reason to criticize and oppose the aggression of this or that nation is to protect the other nations who are threatened or injured by it.

Globalism will never be politically attractive if it does not allow for the local flourishing of imagined communities. This globalism is not a minor matter; nor will it be easy. Hobsbawm is at his formidable best when he argues for the difficulty. "A world of nations cannot exist," he says, "only a world where some potential national groups . . . exclude others." Given the scope of international migration and the mixing of peoples, this may well be right. We can nonetheless work toward the least possible exclusion. We can experiment with political regimes that provide some overarching protection while still accommodating difference. Here, whatever the world-historical drift, is an appropriate agenda for the rational left.

- Michael Walzer

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Donald Huddle, Professor of Economics at Rice University in Houston, reviewed two books on the issue of immigration's impact on the US economy for CHRONICLES *magazine. Contrasting the work of the two authors points up the paucity of data available to support Julian Simon's advocacy of virtually unlimited immigration.*

IMMIGRATION: BENEFICIAL OR NOT ?

Two Book Reviews

FRIENDS OR STRANGERS: THE IMPACT OF IMMIGRATION ON THE U.S. ECONOMY
by George J. Borjas. New York: Basic Books. 274 pp.

THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF IMMIGRATION
by Julian Simon. Cambridge: Basil Blackwell. 402 pp.

The publication of a Julian Simon book is a cause for rejoicing among the advocates of laissez-faire and open-border immigration. According to Dr. Simon, who teaches business administration at the University of Maryland and is an adjunct scholar at the Heritage Foundation and the Cato Institute, all immigrants and refugees, no matter how many or in what form, are good news for the American economy. His latest opus will not disappoint his followers, but it adds little if any substance to the real-world immigration policy debate.

The much smaller volume by University of California economist George Borjas is a valuable contribution to the debate on immigration — it is a penetrating, scholarly work incorporating state-of-the-art economic research and is very accessible to the non-economist. In contrast to Simon's replay of the same old message, that the United States "needs" many more immigrants, Borjas finds that recent immigrants are much more likely to live below the poverty line, to be unskilled and unemployed, and to go on welfare. Borjas concludes that the United States must dramatically upgrade the quality of immigrants if we are to avoid the very large costs of the past fifteen to twenty years.



Unemployed Americans sneaking into Mexico to find work.

GUINDON Detroit Free Press

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I begin with Simon's notions because they are both oversimplified and extreme. Those aspects of Simonism that are not contradicted by Simon himself are contradicted, for the most part, by Borjas later on.

Simon claims substantial scientific documentation to support his controversial thesis: increased immigration of at least one million a year is a "foolproof" way for the U.S. to advance every major national goal and ensure our economic success. Some of Simon's key contentions are that immigrants:

— work harder, save more, and are more innovative than are natives;

— do not displace native workers, not even unskilled minority workers;

—actually create new jobs on net balance by increasing the purchasing power of goods and services and by starting new businesses;

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— use fewer welfare services and more than pay for those they do use in taxes;

— are typically as well-educated occupationally as natives: upon arrival immigrants earn less than natives, but in time they catch up with and then earn more than native workers.

To Simon the popular belief — documented in opinion polls --- that immigrants are harmful to the U.S. economy is the result of misinformation from the media. According to Simon, "cultural homogeneity" is just the contemporary codeword for racist opposition to immigration. Those who differ with him are either badly informed or have a hidden special-interest political agenda.

"The reader will be appalled to find that his analysis consists largely of pseudo-scientific method, overstatement, hyperbole, and contradiction."

Simon claims to be the first economist to "quantify" the costs and benefits of immigration because he has brought together a scientific approach and a solid economic-statistical base for determining the social loss from keeping out non-white foreigners. The reader will be appalled to find that his analysis consists largely of pseudo-scientific method, overstatement, hyperbole, and contradiction.

What then are Simon's so-called scientific and economic statistical bases that "prove' that immigrants, legal and illegal, bring untold economic benefits to American shores? The best way to illustrate Simon's methods and proofs is to offer several typical quotes from his work:

> *Immigrants have a high propensity to start their own businesses; this seems obvious to the casual observer. For example, the proportion of taxi drivers (often self-employed) who have foreign accents seems high from New York to Melbourne to Molmo, Sweden.*
>
> *There does not seem to exist a reliable study of immigrant business openings for the U.S. (though it is badly needed).*

Simon uses a similar method in "proving" that immigrants save more, work harder, and are more innovative than natives:

> - regrettably this research has not yet been done. Therefore, I will be able to do no more than present some scraps of unrefined evidence from other countries' experience.

In effect, Simon offers absolutely no systematic evidence for the majority of his assertions. He is very critical throughout his book of his detractors who use anecdotal accounts and causal empiricism as evidence. But what is sauce for the goose is not sauce for the gander: for Simon himself freely uses newspaper accounts and anecdotes and engages in causal empiricism from cover to cover.

Simon also shows his inconsistency when he turns to the all important question of whether immigrants displace native workers. He concludes that immigrants do not take jobs; they make jobs. Along the way. however, he cites a number of empirical studies that conclude that immigrants *do* displace native workers. For instance, he relies heavily on a study by Larry C. Morgan and Bruce L. Gardner (1982), which shows that the introduction of 210,000 Mexican *braceros* led to a fall in migrant farm labor wages of 9 percent as well as a reduction of 51,000 jobs previously held by natives. According to my simple math, this is a displacement rate of 24.3 percent. Yet Simon later concludes that "empirical studies reviewed in this chapter suggest that general immigration causes little or no unemployment."

The Urban Institute's study of Hispanicized urban labor markets in Los Angeles by Thomas Muller (1984) is also frequently cited by Simon as providing proof positive that immigrants are a windfall benefit. Muller seems to say that the very abundance of cheap Mexican and Central American labor helps retain low-standard, assembly-line industries in Los Angeles County, whereas otherwise, such industries (including clothing "sweat shops") could migrate abroad, presumably to Mexico's cut-rate border zone, to Taiwan, Korea, or Haiti. Thus, jobs are saved.

Yet Simon overlooks Muller's empirical findings that make a strong case against laissez-faire and open-border immigration. True, low cost labor does subsidize the economy of L.A. County, but there are numerous adverse social effects. As Muller himself emphasized, Mexican-Americans and unskilled immigrants already in Southern California had to absorb much of the adverse impact, such as depressed wages and housing shortages.

Muller labeled the almost one million immigrants

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who settled in the L.A. metro area in the 1970s as a success story. But how about the one million other people who left the county in the meantime? Workers who were unwilling to accept lower wages tended to leave the region. Other people, who could not adjust to the spreading Third World immigrant subcultures and the "Hispanization" of public schools (where currently over 50 percent of the students are now of Mexican or Hispanic origin), left as part of the "white flight." Muller himself was seriously concerned about the future socio-economic implications of the high dropout rate of school-age Hispanics of rural peasant background.

Simon has also claimed that immigrants pay more in taxes than they use in welfare services. He ignores refugees, each of whom costs the American taxpayer at least $7,000 per year. His rationale: refugees do not enter the U.S. under normal immigration quotas. Hence they are not immigrants. Even so, he is not able empirically to prove his case. The one extensive study he does depend on, by Gilberto Cardenas and Sidney Weintraub, is only for Texas data, and they ignore such large costs as food stamps, welfare outlays, and unemployment of displaced legal workers.

Borjas' major findings deal a death blow not only to Simon's claim that immigrants benefit the public coffers, but to nearly every one of Simon's major hypotheses. Borjas is able to show that the quality of recent immigration waves to the United States has greatly deteriorated, with less schooling, weaker labor market attachment, higher unemployment rates, lower wage rates, higher poverty rates, and higher rates of welfare use than the waves that arrived in the 1950s and 60s. Nor have recent immigrants performed as well as natives in U.S. labor markets. Borjas finds that this decline in quality costs American society at least $6 billion per year. In present value terms, the immigrants of the late 1970s alone are costing us "$110 billion with a $27.5 billion corresponding loss in tax revenue."

Borjas overturns Simon's entire equation by reversing Simon's assertion that immigrants are more productive than natives. Borjas concludes that average immigrant earnings never catch up with native earnings. Hence immigrants will also pay less in taxes than natives. Moreover, immigrants on average use more, not less, welfare than natives. According to Borjas, the longer female-headed immigrant households live in the United States, the more their welfare usage increases, until after thirty years it exceeds that of the natives by 10 percentage points.

Why did Simon find continuously improving immigrant productivity and upward mobility whereas Borjas found the opposite? The answer is simple. Simon's data are 20 years old and he did not bother to update them, despite the fact that he has read a 1985 study in which Borjas originally documented the decline in immigrant quality. Simon has dismissed the study — saying that it would take years to arrive at a satisfactory understanding of the phenomenon.

Borjas also reverses Simon's generalization that immigrants make rather than take jobs. According to Borjas, a doubling of the number of immigrants in the local labor market reduces the native wage by about 2 percent; a 10 percent increase in the number of immigrants reduces the labor force participation of white natives by .1 percent and reduces the number of weeks worked by .3 percent, not affecting the native unemployment rate.

"Borjas believes it is imperative, therefore, for the United States to raise the quality of future immigrants."

The major problem with Borjas' analysis of labor market effects is that it focuses on legal and not illegal immigrants. Simon has always blurred such differences. In my opinion they should be treated independently, if only because they have differential labor market effects. Legal immigrants are much less likely to displace natives than are illegal alien workers, because it is the illegals who often provide unfair competition for natives and immigrants by working for cash off the books, either paying no taxes or underpaying taxes by getting excess deductions for dependents living abroad, and by undercutting legal wage and safety standards. My own 1982 and 1985 studies of displacement in the Houston metropolitan area indicate that for every 100 "illegal" alien workers, 70 legal workers are displaced or not able to obtain employment.

Despite his somewhat cavalier treatment of the illegal alien problem, Borjas has brought a number of other important insights to current immigration policy, by far the most important of which is significant decline in the quality of immigrants since the 1950s and 60s, including, of course, the three million immigrants legalized recently by the 1986 Immigration and Reform Act.

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It is hard to argue with Borjas' conclusion that these recent immigrant waves are placing a much greater burden on the American welfare state.

Borjas believes it is imperative, therefore, for the United States to raise the quality of future immigrants. Simon, surprisingly enough, agrees with Borjas on this point. As good neoclassical economists, both Borjas and Simon want to sell scarce U.S. greencards to the highest bidder. Borjas realizes, however, that the goal is to bring in high quality immigrants, and this may be inconsistent with selling to the highest bidders, who, once they are here, may turn out to be unproductive. Borjas rightly admits that any visa allocation system is inherently discriminatory. For instance, the 1965 Immigration Act emphasized family reunification (and it was largely responsible for falling immigrant quality). It discriminated against the educated and skilled who had no family connections here.

What I find puzzling, particularly about Borjas' final conclusions, is that he does not seem to recognize the major alternative option — reduce the number of low quality immigrants who are so costly to the United States by cutting immigration quotas below the current 750,000 a year level. Do this by limiting family reunification to spouses and children rather than, as now, inclusion of parents and brothers and sisters. Then determine solely by labor-market criteria just how many skilled immigrants, if any, will productively benefit the U.S. economy without harming the millions of potentially upwardly mobile American workers currently working at low level jobs who would benefit from tight labor markets. From past experience, we know that only when there are shortages of labor do American employers, contractors and recruiters break through the barrier of structural unemployment to hire and help train minority workers.

--- Donald Huddle

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THE METRONOME
As A Population Teaching Tool

By John Tanton

Those of us concerned with the human population problem are often confronted with the mesmerism of numbers, and the general human failing of an inability to comprehend and relate to numbers that run into the millions and billions. World population is now increasing about 90 million per year. How can this be put into terms that we can grasp more easily?

One way is to break the 90 million per year rate down into smaller units of time that are closer to our ordinary experience. For instance, that number of new people reduces to:

246,500	per day
10,270	per hour
171	per minute.

The rate per minute is within range of most metronomes which run up to about 220 strokes per minute. I sometimes will start a metronome running at the beginning of a talk and explain the idea of relating population growth to time. Since the noise and motion are distracting, I shut the metronome off during the speech and then turn it back on at the end of my remarks to remake the point about the rate of increase.

It should be noted that the 90 million per year is the net increase. There are actually about three people born for each one that dies, so the total births per year are around 135 million, with 45 million deaths, leaving the net gain of 90 million. Since the 45 million dying are those on whom society has already spent resources, the situation is actually more difficult than the 90 million figure indicates. We are losing 45 million people who have been educated and trained to some degree. We are gaining 135 million who need the expenditures of many resources to make them into productive citizens.

Every day it grows more imperative that we do all we can to grasp the reality of the constant growth of world population and its effects on the resources of the planet as well as the nature of our life together.

In the 60 seconds it took you to read this page, 171 more people were added to the population of our earth.

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

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